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INTRODUCTION
In recent times, the relation between international trade and
intellectual property (“IP”) enforcement has become a controversial
topic in international law. On one hand, most IP exporting countries
point to increasing trade in counterfeits and fake goods as the
primary factor which destroys markets for the originals and deceives
consumers into buying fake and sometimes even dangerous products.
The lack of adequate IP enforcement at home, and especially in
markets abroad, is identified as a key obstacle to international trade
in IP protected goods. New and ambitious international rules on civil,
criminal, border, and internet IP enforcement are therefore viewed as
the main remedy to restore fair global competition and facilitate trade
in legitimate goods and services worldwide.
Most developing countries, on the other hand, take a different
view: as their goods and services are becoming increasingly
competitive with those of developed country producers, new and
more stringent international IP enforcement rules seek to introduce a
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new set of non-tariff barriers to trade that will preponderantly hinder
developing country exporters. Even if agreements such as the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) do not directly bind
developing countries that are not parties to the treaty, implementing
the new IP enforcement rules in the ACTA negotiating countries
affects the majority of all goods traded internationally. IP
enforcement at the border has the potential to create barriers to trade
in goods not even destined to the markets of future ACTA countries.
For example, when applied to goods in transit, the IP protection and
enforcement standards in the transit country can cause detention and
seizures—even if there is no IP infringement in the country of
production or destination. Some developing countries consider such
enforcement measures as protectionist and their trade restrictive
effects as contrary to the main principle of trade liberalization in the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
This article examines these arguments on the trade restrictive
effects of the new international “gold standards” in IP enforcement.
Parts I and II describe the seizures of generic medicines in transit
through E.U. ports. This has led India and Brazil to challenge the
consistency of the seizures with obligations under WTO Agreements
on trade and IP protection. A key insight is that this dispute is based
on the notion that the WTO TRIPS Agreement contains not only
minimum, but also maximum standards for IP enforcement. In Part
III, the ACTA provisions on border measures are examined as to
whether they do create trade barriers, in particular whether they
mandate or allow seizures of generic medicines in transit. The
analysis not only takes a close look at various provisions affecting
the scope of border measures, but further scrutinizes the impact of
the applicable law rule in ACTA and the safeguards it foresees
against IP enforcement functioning as a trade barrier. Part IV builds
on the analysis by examining whether there exists any conflict
between the ACTA TRIPS-plus enforcement standards and the free
trade and access to medicines safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, while the principle of
harmonious interpretation minimizes direct conflict with TRIPS as a
matter of international law, the policy choices underlying ACTA
raise systemic concerns. Instead of including a few general checks
and balances for the defendant, ACTA should give as much attention
to specific safeguards for all interested parties affected by its
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enforcement rules as it gives to concise and comprehensive new
remedies for right holders.

I. SEIZURES OF GENERIC DRUGS IN TRANSIT
THROUGH E.U. PORTS
Starting in 2008, Dutch authorities decided to seize, delay, and
return several shipments of generic drugs transiting E.U. ports en
route to destinations in South America and Africa on account of
suspected patent infringements.1 The shipments predominantly
originated in India and were all destined for developing countries
such as Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, or Nigeria. The drugs at
issue were protected in the E.U., but apparently not in the countries
of origin or destination. Citing complaints of suspected infringement
from alleged owners of patents or supplementary protection
certificates, customs authorities in the Netherlands have detained a
substantial amount of generic medicines in transit through the
Netherlands.2 These consignments were initially detained and
subsequently destroyed, returned to the country of origin, or, in a few
cases, permitted to proceed to the destination country after
considerable delay.3
1. See Reese Ewing, Brazil to Object to Dutch Seizure of Generic Drug,
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2327254
420090123 (discussing Brazil’s frustration with Dutch authorities for seizing a
shipment of Losartan, a generic high blood pressure medicine, because of an IP
rights claim by a Netherlands-based company); see also Int’l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], Dutch Seizure of Generic Drugs Sparks Controversy,
13 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., no. 3, Jan. 28, 2009, at 5, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly13-3.pdf (stating that Brazil
believes the Netherlands’ actions represent a “distorted use of the international
intellectual property system” and present a setback to universal access to
medicine); William New, Alarm Escalates Over Delayed Generic Drug Shipments
as Action Sought, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 6, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/
2009/03/06
/alarm-escalates-over-delayed-generic-drugshipments-as-action-sought/ (noting a statement from health professionals,
including Oxfam International and Health Action International, condemning the
Dutch seizure as a risk to the “critical treatment” of HIV-positive Nigerian
patients).
2. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member
State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010)
[hereinafter India Consultation Request].
3. See id. at 1 ("Available evidence confirms that the customs authorities
seized at least 19 consignments of generic drugs in 2008 and 2009 while in transit
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One example is the hypertension drug losartan potassium,
manufactured as a generic in India by Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and
patented for the E.U. territory by DuPont and Merck Sharp &
Dohme. In December 2008, Dutch custom authorities detained a
consignment of losartan medication in transit to Brazil at Schipol
Airport in Amsterdam.4 Due to threats of destruction by the right
holder, the consignment was subsequently returned to India. Similar
action was taken as regards, for example, generics for the drugs
clopidogrel, abacavir, olanzapine, and rivastigmine.5 In all cases, the
Dutch authorities acted pursuant to the European Communities
Council Regulation No. 1383/2003 on border measures (“BMR”).6
The public health dimension of the transit seizures is probably best
demonstrated by the following incident: about three months after the
controversial losartan detention occurred, an UNITAID7 funded
shipment consisting of forty-nine kilograms of abacavir sulfate
tablets was confiscated at Schiphol Airport by Dutch customs
authorities under the claim that it contained counterfeit goods.8 The
medicines, manufactured by the Indian company Aurobindo, are
used in second-line treatment of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria for a program
implemented by the Clinton Foundation on behalf of UNITAID.
UNITAID protested sharply, insisting that the shipment did not
contain counterfeit drugs or any other goods infringing on IP rights,
and that the medication was prequalified by the World Health
through the Netherlands, 16 of which originated in India.").
4. See id. at 4.
5. See id.
6. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7, 9 (EC) (stating
that customs authorities are permitted to detain or suspend the release of goods for
a period of three working days if they suspect infringement of an intellectual
property right to allow a “right-holder” to submit an application for customs
action).
7. UNITAID is an international drug purchase facility established in 2006 to
provide long-term, sustainable, and predictable funding to increase access and
reduce prices of diagnostics and quality drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and tuberculosis in developing countries. It was founded by France,
Brazil, Chile, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and it is hosted and administered
by the World Health Organization (“WHO”). See How UNITAID Came About,
UNITAID, http://www.unitaid.eu/en/about/-background-mainmenu-18/159.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
8. See UNITAID Statement on Dutch Confiscation of Medicines Shipment,
UNITAID,
http://www.unitaid.eu/en/resources/news/156-unitaid-statement-ondutch-confiscation-of-medicines-shipment.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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Organization (“WHO”) and had received tentative approval by the
United States Food and Drug Administration.9
The incident occurred shortly before a TRIPS Council Meeting on
March 3-4, 2009 where India and Brazil issued strong statements
against the European Communities (“EC”) border measures and
threatened legal action under the WTO dispute settlement system as
a last resort.10 Responding to an earlier EC statement in the WTO
General Council that downplayed the Lortasan seizure,11 Brazil
pointed out that the amount temporarily seized would have been
enough to treat 300,000 patients suffering from hypertension for a
full month.12 It further alleged that some of the earlier seizures in the
Netherlands led to the destruction of the consignments concerned.13
Brazil finally argued that these actions severely hamper medicine
distribution to needy populations, given the risk that on key transit
routes supplies may be regularly intercepted based on the assertion of
patent infringement in the transit country.14
Apart from India and Brazil, several NGOs and some
commentators view the EC border measures as “contrary to the letter
and spirit of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health,” as

9. See id.
10. See Statement by Brazil, TRIPS Council, Agenda Item ‘M’ (Other
Business) Public Health Dimension of TRIPS Agreement (Feb. 3-4, 2009),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/intervention-bybrazil.pdf, 1, ¶¶ 11, 16 [hereinafter Statement by Brazil] (claiming that the Dutch
actions violated WTO principles because the medicine detained was not patentprotected in either the exporting countries or the importing country); see also
Intervention by India, TRIPS Council, Agenda item 'M' (Other Business) Public
Health Dimension of the TRIPS Agreement (Feb. 3-4, 2009), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/
intervention-by-india.doc
[hereinafter Intervention by India] (claiming that the confiscation of the generic
medicines by the Dutch has a direct and negative impact on the legitimate trade of
generic medicines, public health, and universal access to medicine).
11. See WTO General Council, Any Other Business (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.ip-watch.org/files/WTO_GENERAL_COUNCIL.doc (asserting that
the Dutch authorities only temporarily detained the medicine to control it as
allowed by TRIPS and E.U. customs law and that the authorities were under no
obligation to return the medicine to India).
12. See Statement by Brazil, supra note 10, ¶ 6 (noting that even though the
shipment’s size is not relevant in ascertaining the gravity of the Dutch seizure, the
potential benefits of the medications in question were extensive).
13. See id. ¶ 8.
14. See id. ¶ 9.
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potentially countering efforts under the WTO’s so-called “paragraph
six mechanism” to export drugs produced under a compulsory
license into countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity, and as inconsistent with resolutions issued by the WHO
and the EC Parliament.15

II. WTO COMPLAINTS BY INDIA AND BRAZIL
On May 12, 2010, India and Brazil initiated separate WTO dispute
settlement proceedings against the E.U. and the Netherlands by
requesting consultations over the seizures of generic medicines in
transit.16 These requests for consultations are the first step under the
WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”).17 Since the consultations failed to
settle the dispute within sixty days after the date of receipt of the
request for consultations, India or Brazil may request the
establishment of a panel,18 which would then issue a report on the
consistency with obligations under the WTO Agreements of the
seizures of generics, the BMR as such, and its application in the
cases described above in Part I.19 Later, in May 2010, Canada,
Ecuador, China, Japan, and Turkey requested to join the

15. See Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of
Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, 13 BRIDGES, no. 1, Feb.-Mar. 2009, at 13,
available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/ 44192/ (claiming that the confiscations
are an exaggerated approach to intellectual property law and raising concerns that
legitimate trade may fall under attack as well); Letter from Christian WagnerAhlfs, BUKO Pharma-Kampagne et al., to Pascal Lamy, Dir. Gen., World Trade
Org. (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://keionline.org/misc-docs/seizures/
WTO_seizures_18feb.pdf (noting that intellectual property right claims conflict
with the ability to provide “access to medicine for all” and with the ability of
organizations to properly address public health issues).
16. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2; Request for Consultations by
Brazil, European Union and a Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit,
WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Brazil Consultation Request].
17. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 4(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (stating that
each member must allow sufficient opportunity for consultation on any complaints
made by another member regarding any activity affecting an agreement in the first
member’s territory).
18. See id. art. 4(7).
19. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 1-2; Brazil Consultation
Request, supra note 16, at 2-3.

652

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

consultations in accordance with DSU Article 4(11).20 The
“substantial trade interests” required by DSU Article 4(11) were,
inter alia, based on exports of generic drugs to a large number of
countries worldwide, on issues of public health and access to
medicines, and on the fact that drugs destined to the requesting
country had been seized in the E.U.21 All these requests were
subsequently accepted by the E.U.22 At the time of writing, neither
Brazil nor India has requested the establishment of a panel or
notified the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of a mutually
agreed solution.

A. ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES WITH WTO/TRIPS PROVISIONS
Brazil considers the above-mentioned measures as inconsistent,
inter alia, with the following WTO provisions:
1. Articles V:1, V:2, V:3, V:4, V:5, V:7 and X:3 of the GATT 1994;
2. Articles 1.1, 2, 28, 31, 41.1, 41.2, 42, 49, 50.3, 50.7, 50.8, 51, 52, 53.1,
53.2, 54, 55, 58(b), and 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article 4bis of
the Paris Convention of 1967;

20. See Dispute Settlement DS409: European Union and a Member State
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (Brazil), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm (last updated June 22, 2010) [hereinafter
Brazil WTO Dispute]; see also Dispute Settlement DS408: European Union and a
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit (India), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm (last updated
June 22, 2010) [hereinafter India WTO Dispute].
21. See, e.g., Request to Join Consultations by Canada, European Union and a
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/2 (June 1, 2010)
(stating that Canada exports forty percent of its generic drugs to other countries
because Canada supports and is active on the issues of public health and access to
medicine); Request to Join Consultations by China, European Union and a
Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/6 (June 3, 2010)
(noting that China produces a large quantity of generic drugs and is a bilateral
trade partner of the E.U. and the Netherlands); Request to Join Consultations by
Ecuador, European Union and a Member State Seizure of Generic Drugs in
Transit, WT/DS409/3 (June 2, 2010) (explaining that generic drugs shipped to
Ecuador were seized in the E.U.’s territory, causing Ecuador to believe that
shipments of drugs to Ecuador may be intercepted in the future).
22. See Brazil WTO Dispute, supra note 20; India WTO Dispute, supra note 20
(reporting that the E.U. had accepted the requests of Canada, China, Ecuador,
India, Japan, and Turkey to join the consultations).
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3. Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement23

India in turn provides more concrete arguments on inconsistencies
of the measures with some specific provisions of WTO law,
including:
1. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Article V of the GATT 1994 because the
measures at issue, inter alia, are unreasonable, discriminatory and
interfere with, and impose unnecessary delays and restrictions on, the
freedom of transit of generic drugs lawfully manufactured within, and
exported from, India by the routes most convenient for international
transit;
2. Article X of the GATT 1994, including, without limitation, Article X:3,
because the measures at issue, inter alia, are not administered in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner;
3. Article 28 read together with Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement,
Article 4bis of the Paris Convention, 1967 and the last sentence of
paragraph 6(i) of the Decision of the General Council of August 30, 2003
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the “August 30, 2003 Decision”)
because a cumulative reading of these provisions confirms, inter alia, that
the rights conferred on the owner of a patent cannot be extended to
interfere with the freedom of transit of generic drugs lawfully
manufactured within, and exported from, India;
4. Articles 41 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement because the measures at
issue, inter alia, create barriers to legitimate trade, permit abuse of the
rights conferred on the owner of a patent, are unfair and inequitable,
unnecessarily burdensome and complicated and create unwarranted
delays; and
5. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement read together with the provisions of
the August 30, 2003 Decision because the measures at issue, inter alia,
authorise interference with the freedom of transit of drugs that may be
produced in, and exported from, India to Members of the World Trade
Organization with insufficient or no capacity in the pharmaceutical sector
that seek to obtain supplies of such products needed to address their
public health problems by making effective use of compulsory
licensing.24

23. See Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 16, at 4.
24. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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India considers further:
[T]hat the measures at issue also have a serious adverse impact on the
ability of developing and least-developed country members of the World
Trade Organization to protect public health and to provide access to
medicines for all. Accordingly, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
referred to above must be interpreted and implemented in light of the
objectives and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement, the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health adopted on 14 November 2001 and in the light of
Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which recognizes the right of all persons to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.25

This article does not purport to offer a comprehensive analysis of
all the alleged inconsistencies between the seizures of generic
medicines in transit and WTO law.26 Instead, it shall be limited to
some thoughts on potential violations of TRIPS provisions as these
may effectively serve as an important international law benchmark to
assess the border measure provisions in ACTA.

B. TRIPS AS A BENCHMARK CONSTRAINING ADDITIONAL IP
PROTECTION
Interestingly, both India and Brazil argue that the E.U. and Dutch
measures at issue not only infringe on obligations under the
WTO/GATT rules on trade in goods,27 but also are inconsistent with
25. Id. at 3.
26. For an analysis of some of the IP, trade, and public health issues under
WTO law, see generally XAVIER SEUBA, FREE TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS: THE LIMITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AT THE
BORDER 1-42 (2010), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/04/
seuba_web_10.pdf; Shashank P. Kumar, Border Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights Against In-Transit Generic Pharmaceuticals: An Analysis of
Character and Consistency, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 506, 511-518 (2010).
27. Here, the potential of border measures against goods in transit to serve as a
barrier to international trade and the freedom of transit makes an infringement of
GATT Article V a possible scenario: the “Freedom of Transit” clause in GATT
Article V(2) stipulates that “[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the territory
of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit,
for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties.” See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. V(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. This is, however, subject to compliance “with
applicable customs laws and regulations” and the potential invocation of a general
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several provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. In at least one aspect,
this is a novel type of dispute. For the first time in WTO dispute
settlement history, TRIPS is used as a benchmark for constraining
additional (“TRIPS-plus”) IP protection. According to both India’s
and Brazil’s consultation requests, the E.U. and Dutch measures are
argued to be inconsistent with, inter alia, TRIPS Article 1(1), Article
41, and other norms from the TRIPS section on border measures
(Articles 51-60). The crucial point is that these alleged infringements
do not result from failure to meet the TRIPS minimum standards of
IP protection and enforcement.
Instead, it is the TRIPS-plus nature that caused the seizure of
generics in transit. The legal basis for the transit seizures, the BMR,
goes beyond the TRIPS minimum standards in several aspects. For
one, the BMR covers not only “trademark counterfeit goods” and
“pirated copyright goods” as defined in TRIPS;28 it covers
infringements of other IP rights such as patents.29 The BMR further
mandates border measures against goods in transit30 and those
destined for exportation under BMR Article 1(1). TRIPS, on the
other hand, demands such measures only against imports.31 In
addition to alleging inconsistency of the BMR as such, the
consultation requests also argue that its application to generic drugs
in transit by the Dutch custom authorities violates TRIPS
obligations.32
These complaints challenge one of the central elements of
international IP law: the notion of minimum standards.33 Generally,
exception clause, which, under Article XX(d), allows exceptions for measures
“necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations relating to the protection
of patents.” Id. arts. V(3), XX(d).
28. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 51, n.13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
29. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
30. Technically, the BMR does not use the term transit but instead refers in
Article 1(1) to specific customs procedures defined in the E.U. Uniform Customs
Code. See id. art. 1(1)(a) (referring to Articles 61, 37, and 183 of the E.U. Uniform
Customs Code).
31. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51.
32. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2-3; Brazil Consultation
Request, supra note 16, at 2-4.
33. The concept of minimum standards finds expression especially in Articles
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international treaties on IP protection create a “floor,” setting a
minimum level of protection that must be available in all national
laws of the contracting parties without any apparent limitation as to
the further extension of IP protection.34 This notion of minimum
standards is a central feature in the long history of international IP
protection whose development has primarily been a one-way route
towards ever-increasing levels of protection.35
However, some provisions in existing treaty law from the Berne
and Paris Conventions as well as the TRIPS Agreement may function
as a door-opener for maximum standards, or “ceilings,”36 to
international IP protection. Relevant in this context, TRIPS Article
1(1) expressly allows WTO Members to grant more extensive
protection than what is prescribed in the Agreement but only
19 and 20 of the revised Berne Convention as well as Article 19 of the Paris
Convention. The wording of Article 20 of the Berne Convention in this regard is
quite instructive when it requires further agreements to “grant to authors more
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention.” See Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works arts. 19-20, Sept. 9, 1886, as
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne
Convention] (emphasis added); accord Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property art. 19, Mar. 20, 1883, (as last revised at Stockholm, July 14,
1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
34. See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: ‘Adequate Remuneration’ for
Non-Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 927, 944 (2008) (noting that
in addition to offering minimum levels of protection, TRIPS also attempts to
control discriminatory practices ); see also Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in
International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007)
(claiming that TRIPS was intentionally created to set minimum, rather than
maximum, standards of protection).
35. “[O]nce rights have been inscribed into the text of an IP convention, they
basically become sacrosanct for now and the future. Revision conferences (with
only a few remarkable exceptions) have regularly served the purpose of further
strengthening the position of right holders; hardly ever was an effort undertaken to
question or curtail incumbent rules.” See Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse Khan, Enough is Enough The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International
Intellectual Property Protection 8-9 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop.,
Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1326429. One exception is
the Revision of the Berne Convention 1971, where an Annex addresses the option
for developing countries to grant compulsory licenses mainly for translation
purposes and the proposed amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in the course of
the Doha process. See WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter TRIPS Amendment].
36. For a general analysis of this concept in international IP law, see Kur &
Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 35.
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“provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of
this Agreement.”37 One justification for such a “ceiling” function
comes from the incorporation of TRIPS into the WTO multilateral
trading system: as several TRIPS provisions indicate, minimal, but
also excessive or abusive reliance on IP protection, can distort and
create barriers to international trade.38 Especially for border measures
against IP infringements, the strong link to global trade and the
traditional WTO/GATT approach towards further trade liberalization
provide a rationale which explains binding language safeguarding the
37. In full, Article 1(1) states: “Members shall give effect to the provisions of
this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.” TRIPS Agreement art.
1(1) (emphasis added). In the June 2010 TRIPS Council meeting, the delegate of
India emphasized the “non-contravention” requirement and pointed to maximum
standards, or ceilings, in TRIPS that may stand against certain TRIPS-plus
measures in national laws and in international agreements such as ACTA. See
Intervention by India, to WTO TRIPS Council, on Agenda Item M: TRIPS-plus
Enforcement Trends 1 (June 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS-plus Enforcement India],
available
at
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/
intervention-by-india-seizure-of-generic-drug-consignments-at-ec-ports.pdf. In the
same vein, the delegate of China stressed that TRIPS-plus protection and
enforcement “shall not contravene the provisions of [TRIPS].” See Intervention by
China, to WTO TRIPS Council, on Agenda Item M: TRIPS-plus Enforcement
Trends (June 8-9, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS-plus Enforcement China], available at
http://keionline.org/node/883.
38. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pmbl. (emphasizing the need to “ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade”); id. art. 41 (stating that IP enforcement
procedures must protect against infringement of intellectual property rights without
blocking legitimate trade); id. art. 8(2), 40(1) (noting that measures may be
necessary to prevent “practices which unreasonably restrain trade” and that some
practices may adversely affect trade); see also CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 25 (2007) (suggesting that the higher the level of protection
for intellectual property rights, the more likely the protections will create barriers
for legitimate trade); ICTSD & UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 75 (2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
ResourceBookIndex.htm; Klaus Elfring, Allgemeine Bestimmungen und
Grundprinzpien [General Provisions and Basic Principles], in TRIPS:
INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS [TRIPS:
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW] 79, 84 (Jan
Busche & Peter-Tobias Stoll eds., 2007).
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interests of traders.39
In order to review the consistency of the TRIPS-plus elements of
the BMR and its application to generics in transit with TRIPS, one
therefore needs to assess which form of additional IP protection has
the potential to “contravene” TRIPS.40 Without excluding other
arguments for findings of contravention,41 instances where this
qualification of TRIPS Article 1(1) applies are most likely cases
where one can point to conflicts with a mandatory TRIPS provision
instead of an optional one. However, mandatory rules that impose an
obligation on states to limit IP protection are rare in international
law.42 Instead, most limitations take the form of optional provisions,
for example the so-called “TRIPS flexibilities,” which allow a
country to freely decide on which grounds it allows for compulsory
licenses to be issued in its national IP regime.43 In relation to the
TRIPS provisions on IP enforcement, however, things are different:
several provisions contain binding language which set out general
principles upholding procedural guarantees for the defendant or
preventing the creation of trade barriers as well as specific
obligations limiting enforcement measures.44
Since TRIPS integrates safeguards for both free trade45 and public
health considerations,46 and balances these with its provisions on IP

39. Cf. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 474 (3d ed. 2008) (describing TRIPS Articles 51-60 on border measures
as the most “trade-related” section of the TRIPS Agreement).
40. For a more detailed analysis of this term, see generally Henning Grosse
Ruse - Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift? Exploring Maximum Standards in
International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56 (2009).
41. See ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 38, at 24 (explaining that the pressure
to accept TRIPS-plus standards in FTA negotiations might contravene the
objective and purpose of the WTO Agreement and TRIPS to provide a secure
framework for the conduct of international trade relations).
42. For a useful overview, see generally P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L.
OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND
EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 55 (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/
publications/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf.
43. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, ¶¶ 4, 5 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
44. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41(1-4), 42, 43(2), 46, 47, 48(1), 50(3, 4, 6),
52, 53, 55, 56, 58(b-c).
45. See id. pmbl., art. 41(1).
46. See id. arts. 8(1), 31bis.
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protection under TRIPS Article 7,47 the TRIPS-plus character of the
E.U. and Dutch measures may be inconsistent with TRIPS. One
concrete example from the list of TRIPS provisions claimed in
Brazil’s and India’s consultations is the idea that seizing goods
merely in transit based on alleged IP infringements according to the
law of the transit country may run counter to the agreement’s
obligation to make border measures dependant on prima facie
evidence for IP infringements based on the “law of the country of
importation”.48 While such a finding depends on a narrow
interpretation of the term “country of importation,” which does not
include transit countries,49 the case provides one practical example
where a TRIPS provision could serve as a ceiling rather than a floor
in international IP protection.
TRIPS Article 52 is one of the provisions Brazil alleges to be
infringed by the seizure of generics in transit.50 This allegation may
go even further since the TRIPS preamble expresses an aim “to
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”51
Furthermore, Article 41(1) contains a general obligation that IP
enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such a manner as to
avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for
47. Id. art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”).
48. TRIPS Agreement art. 52; see Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan & Thomas
Jaeger, Policing Patents Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting
Generic Drugs Under EC and WTO Intellectual Property Regimes, 40 INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 502, 533-34 (2009) (arguing that seizing goods
in transit according to the law of the transit country is only consistent with TRIPS
if the term “country of importation” is interpreted to include transit countries).
49. See id. at 534-36 (maintaining that the TRIPS agreement does not include
countries of transit in the definition of “country of importation” because it could
restrict countries’ access to medicines, which does not encourage social and
economic welfare); Kumar, supra note 26, at 512-13 (concluding that
“importation” must be read to include only the destination country in order to
prevent measures that create barriers to legitimate trade); see also discussion infra
Part III(B)(1) (comparing Article 7(1) of the ACTA text with Article 52 of the
TRIPS Agreement and discussing the difference in how goods in transit are
affected under each regulation).
50. See Brazil Consultation Request, supra note 16.
51. See TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
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safeguards against their abuse.” India and Brazil have both also
claimed a violation of TRIPS Article 41(1).52 A key issue here would
be a Panel’s approach to interpreting ambiguous terms such as
“legitimate trade” and “abuse.” If the Panel would take the TRIPS
balancing objectives in Article 7 and its public interest principles in
Article 8 seriously, public health and access to medicines
considerations should play an important role.53 Indeed, all WTO
Members—including the E.U. and its member states—emphasized in
the Doha Declaration the importance of such an interpretation based
on Articles 7 and 8, especially in the public health context.54
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether India or Brazil will
continue their challenge of the E.U. and Dutch border measures as
TRIPS violations under the WTO dispute settlement system
continue.55

III. ACTA PROVISIONS ON BORDER MEASURES
Forced by various leaks after years of secrecy,56 the negotiating
parties to ACTA, the European Union, the United States, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, Morocco,
Mexico and Switzerland, finally released an official draft text in
April 2010.57 Subsequent to this release, the July round of
negotiations in Lucerne, Switzerland produced a revised ACTA draft
which again leaked in the middle of the month.58 Another ACTA
52. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 3; Brazil Consultation
Request, supra note 16, at 4.
53. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8.
54. See Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶¶ 4-5.
55. Alternatively, the WTO complaint may serve as a bargaining chip—
especially for India in its FTA negotiations with the E.U. See generally India Plans
Front to Nip New Piracy Law, THE ECON. TIMES (India), May 29, 2010,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ economy/policy/India-plans-front-tonip-new-piracy-law/articleshow/5986902.cms.
56. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/
Deliberative Draft, Jan 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010],
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked
Text Dated January 18, 2010”).
57. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisonal/
Deliberative Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010],
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc _146029.pdf.
58. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/
Deliberative Draft, July 1, 2010, [hereinafter ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010],
available
at
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta
(follow
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draft leaked after the Washington round of negotiations in August
2010.59 On October 2, 2010, the negotiating parties finally released a
new consolidated text reflecting the “outcome of the 11th and final
round of negotiations,” which is almost identical to the final ACTA
version, which the negotiating parties made available in early
December 2010.60 The following analysis is largely based on the
December 2010 final text, with specific references to earlier versions
contained in the October and April 2010 official drafts, the July text,
and the August ACTA draft.
In a press release after the first official release, the E.U.
Commission emphasized that “the overall objective of ACTA is to
address large-scale infringements of intellectual property rights
which have a significant economic impact,” and stressed that “ACTA
will by no means lead to a limitation of civil liberties or to
‘harassment’ of consumers.”61 The Commission also points out that
ACTA “will not hamper access to generic medicines.”62 A
subsequent press release after the Lucerne round of negotiations in
July 2010 went further, asserting that “ACTA will not hinder the
cross-border transit of legitimate generic medicines.”63 Nevertheless,
amongst the various concerns expressed by NGOs and academics
about the impact of ACTA was its potential impact on the free transit

“Consolidated ACTA Text, July 1, 2010”).
59. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/
Deliberative Draft, Aug. 25, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010],
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked
Text Dated August 25, 2010”).
60. For the October text, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal
Predecisonal/Deliberative Draft, Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Oct. 2,
2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc
_146699.pdf. For the final ACTA text, see Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.
dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf.
61. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21,
2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552 (stressing that
ACTA will not modify IP law, but will create rules for enforcing IP rights in
“courts, at borders, and over the internet”).
62. Id.
63. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
Report on the 9th Round of Negotiations (July 2, 2010), http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=588&serie=352&langld=en.
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of goods and, hence, on international trade.64 There were allegations
that ACTA would oblige countries to introduce border measures
against goods in transit along the lines of the BMR, which had led to
the highly controversial seizures of generic drugs in transit from
India to the various developing countries discussed above.65 In
response, the E.U., among others, stated after the release of the
October 2010 text that “ACTA provides a balanced Agreement,
which replies to concerns expressed by Members of the European
Parliament, Non Governmental Organisations and other stakeholders regarding issues such as [t]he safeguard of access to
medicines.”66
Now with the final round of negotiations concluded and the
resulting final text available, does ACTA indeed mandate seizures
against goods in transit? And does it extend to goods allegedly
infringing patents (instead of merely applying to pirated copyright
and counterfeit trademark goods, as is the case with TRIPS)? Before
the October 2010 ACTA text, the relevant ACTA provisions were
complex and often heavily bracketed, indicating that the negotiating
parties had not reached consensus and that different options were still
on the table.67 In the October version, however, there seems to have
been widespread agreement over most controversial issues as only a
few reservations of some negotiating parties remained,68 which
64. See, e.g., Text of Urgent ACTA Communique: International Experts Find
that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests,
AM. U. WASH. C. L. PROGRAM INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (June 23, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique [hereinafter Urgent ACTA
Communique] (stating that ninety academics, practitioners, and public interest
organizations concluded that ACTA is also harmful to fundamental rights, internet
regulation, access to medicine, IP law, international law, and democracy).
65. See id.
66. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, All You Want to Know About the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Oct. 20, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/508&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en (noting that ACTA even references the Doha
Declaration, TRIPS Article 7, and “the exclusion of patent infringements from the
section on border control and penal enforcement.”).
67. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 2.X; ACTA Draft—
July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X; ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57,
art. 2.X.
68. As Bridges reports, “an EU official close to the negotiations said that the
October text was over 99 percent agreed, and that officials would be able to iron
out remaining differences ‘through e-mail contact’ in the weeks to come. No more
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apparently have been resolved in the December 2010 final text. In
the following Sections A-C, the main provisions of the December
2010 ACTA text relevant for border measures are reproduced and
analyzed for their potential to mandate or allow seizures of generic
drugs in transit.

A. SCOPE OF ACTA BORDER MEASURES
The ACTA provisions on border measures extend the existing
minimum standards under TRIPS, which obliges WTO members to
provide border measures only against “importation of counterfeit
trademark or pirated copyright goods.”69 Based on the final
December 2010 ACTA text, Section 3 contains the following main
provision on the scope of border measures:
Section 3: Border Measures
ARTICLE 13: SCOPE OF THE BORDER MEASURES
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of
intellectual property rights protection and without prejudice to the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for effective border enforcement
of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights and that
avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.70

Further, Article 16 is decisive for determining the scope of
obligations for border measures in ACTA:

rounds of negotiations would be needed, the official said, describing the process as
‘really at the final stage, about to cross the finishing line.’” See ICTSD, AntiCounterfeiting Trade Pact ’99 Percent’ Complete, 14 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., no. 34, Oct. 6, 2010, at 1, available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/
bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly14-34.pdf.
69. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. The border measures obligations under
TRIPS cover easily detectable forms of copyright and trademark infringements,
which custom authorities should be able to identify without the need for technical
expertise. Id. art. 51, n.14.
70. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. Footnote 4 to
Article 13 states: “Where a Party has dismantled substantially all controls over
movement of goods across its border with another Party with which it forms part of
a customs union, it shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Section at
that border.” Footnote 5 provides: “It is understood that there shall be no obligation
to apply the procedures set forth in this section to goods put on the market in
another country by or with the consent of the right holder.” Finally, footnote 6
says: “The Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed information do
not fall within the scope of this Section.”
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ARTICLE 16: BORDER MEASURES
1. Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures for import and export
shipments under which:
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative, to suspend
the release of suspect goods; and
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request its competent authorities
to suspend the release of suspect goods.
2. A Party may adopt and maintain procedures with respect to suspect intransit goods or in other situations where the goods are under Customs
control under which:
(a) its customs authorities may act upon their own initiative, to suspend
the release of, or to detain, suspect goods; and
(b) where appropriate, a right holder may request the competent
authorities to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect goods.71

Together, these provisions determine the types of IP infringements
and the trade activities for which future ACTA parties must provide
border measures in their national laws. To determine whether ACTA
mandates or allows seizures of generic drugs in transit, several
aspects pertaining to the scope of border measures under ACTA are
particularly relevant. The first subsection answers the question of
how ACTA border measures apply to goods suspected of patent
infringement.72 The second subsection examines how ACTA
addresses goods in transit.73 The third subsection then looks at other
forms of alleged infringements that might affect international trade in
generic medicines.74 The final subsection scrutinizes the chapeau of
ACTA Article 13 to determine which options exist so as to allow
countries to exclude from the scope of border measures those forms
of IP infringements which may pose a significant threat to generics
in transit.75
1. Patent Infringements
The ACTA provision on the scope of border measures has been
one of the most contentious among the negotiating parties. This
provision concerns primarily the types of IP-infringing goods to be
covered, but also addresses what form of trade activities fall under
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. art. 16.
See discussion infra Part III(A)(1).
See discussion infra Part III(A)(2).
See discussion infra Part III(A)(3).
See discussion infra Part III(A)(4).
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ACTA border measures. Some earlier drafts would have obliged
contracting parties to impose border measures against goods “in
transit” and in relation to any goods “suspected of infringing
intellectual property rights.”76 The latter phrase was defined in the
April ACTA draft as “goods infringing any of the intellectual
property rights covered by TRIP,” in principle including patents.77 As
some of the earlier leaked ACTA drafts indicate, the E.U. favored
this approach.78 It pushed for ACTA’s provisions to be broadly
defined so as to ensure that infringements of geographical indications
(“GIs”) fall under its provisions.79
76. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X:1-2.
77. Id. Its application to patents was, however, unclear. Article 2.X:2 continued
by allowing to exclude certain types of IP infringements if the rights concerned
were inter alia “[protected by [non-product- or sector-specific] [registration] sui
generis systems].” The heavily bracketed text indicated that goods infringing
certain (registration) sui generis rights may be excluded from the scope of ACTA’s
border measures. The relevant question then was whether this optional exception
would cover goods infringing patents. While patent rights under TRIPS Article
27(1) must be granted without discrimination to the field of technology and hence
arguably are non-product and non-sector specific, they would normally not be
considered a sui generis system of protection. The term refers to an IP protection
mechanism “of its own kind.” It is commonly used for rights in investment bearing
databases outside copyright (for example, see Council Directive 96/9, arts. 7-11,
1996 O.J. (L 77) 20, 21 (EC)) or to systems of plant variety protection outside
patent law. See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.3(b). More recently, certain mechanisms
to protect traditional knowledge and/or related genetic resources have been
referred to as sui generis. See Traditional Knowledge, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). It therefore seems
unlikely that the negotiating parties had patent rights in mind when they allowed
excluding rights protected by certain sui generis systems.
78. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisional/
Deliberative Draft art. 2.X:2, Mar. 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft—Mar. 18,
2010], available at https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/ acta (follow “Full
Leaked Text Dated Mar. 18, 2010”). The approach chosen also strongly resembles
Article 1 of the BMR. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X:1.
79. See EU, U.S. to Discuss Differences Over ACTA Scope in Bilateral
Meeting, 28 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, no. 30, July 30, 2010, http://insidetrade.com/
Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-07/30/2010/eu-us-to-discuss-differences-overacta-scope-in-bilateral-meeting/menu-id-710.html (discussing the E.U.’s desire to
broaden the scope of ACTA to protect any infringement of GIs in the same manner
as infringements of trademarks and copyrights). This report notes that the “scope
of the agreement is expected to be a main issue of discussion since both [the
United States and the E.U.] have reached a deadlock on whether products with
geographic indications (“GIs”) should be included in the agreement.” Id. See
generally Jimmy Koo, Comparing ACTA Texts April 2010 v. July 2010, AM. U.
WASH. C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Aug. 12, 2010),
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For most commentators, however, the crucial issue was the threat
that border measures aimed at alleged patent infringement pose to the
free transit of medicines.80 ACTA negotiators, including the E.U.,
responded by declaring publicly that “patents will not be covered in
the Section on Border Measures.”81 But even on the basis of the
subsequently leaked ACTA texts, there was no clear expression that
goods in transit allegedly infringing patent rights were to be excluded
from the general scope of border measures under the ACTA draft.82
In the December 2010 ACTA text reproduced above, the matter has
finally been addressed: it clarifies that “[t]he Parties agree that
patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall within
the scope of this Section.”83 This derogates from the general ACTA
definition of the term “intellectual property” as comprising “all
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1
through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement”84 and hence from the
general obligation under ACTA Article 6(1) to foresee enforcement
procedures against “any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Agreement.” It excludes patents and the
protection of undisclosed information from the ACTA border
measure obligations without the need to resort to the ambiguous
provision in Article 13 and its conditions for limiting the scope of
border measures to certain types of IP infringements.85 As a result, no
future ACTA party will be obliged to introduce or maintain a system
of border measures that applies to suspected patent infringing goods.
From the perspective of international trade and access to medicines,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/ go/koo08122010 (discussing the issues
surrounding GIs as a potential deal-breaker).
80. See Urgent ACTA Communique, supra note 64.
81. See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63.
82. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (stating that parties
may exclude “certain rights other than trademarks, copyrights and GIs” from the
definition of “goods infringing an intellectual property right.”). In the ACTA draft
that leaked after the Washington, D.C. round of negotiations, the text remains
unchanged from the July text version. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra
note 59, art. 2.X.
83. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13, n.6. The October
2010 version already contained similar language stating “for the purpose of this
Agreement, Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.”
See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2.X n.6.
84. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(h).
85. See id. art. 13; see also discussion infra Part III(A)(4) (providing a more
detailed analysis of this provision).
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this is certainly an improvement from earlier drafts. As the
subsequent analysis will show, however, it is by no means a
sufficient safeguard to ensure that transit seizures of generic
medicines do not occur.
While ACTA does not mandate border measures for suspected
patent infringement, a further question is whether ACTA allows its
future contracting parties to introduce or maintain such a system.
This concerns not only the E.U., where the BMR covers both patents
and transits,86 but given the dynamics of international IP law and
policy, one must expect the trend of a continuous increase in
protection and enforcement standards to continue.87 It is probably not
too farfetched that in the near to medium future, some countries
might consider ACTA standards as insufficient and strive for
“ACTA-plus” standards in their own laws and/or in international
agreements. The question then is whether, and to what extent, ACTA
would allow its future contracting parties to have additional, stronger
IP enforcement laws such as border enforcement against allegedly
patent infringing goods. Here, the general rule in Article 2(1) of the
December 2010 ACTA text allows “more extensive protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection and enforcement does not
contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”88
Future ACTA parties therefore can extend border measures to
cover goods suspected of patent infringement, unless this can be
argued to “contravene” ACTA provisions. Would such extended
coverage amount to contravening the negotiating parties’ agreement
expressed in Footnote 6 to the Border Measures Section that “patents
do not fall within the scope of this Section”? This appears not to be
the case: by agreeing to exclude inter alia patent rights from the
section on border measures, the negotiating parties primarily wanted
to ensure that ACTA does not contain an obligation to foresee border
86. See discussion supra Part I.
87. See Kur & Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 35, at 8-14 (explaining that
typically, once rights have become part of a convention, they remain part of the
convention while new rules and rights are added on top of them, strengthening
rights and protections).
88. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
This provision mirrors TRIPS Article 1(1), which is discussed in detail in Part
II(B) above and Part IV below.
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measures against goods suspected of patent infringements. In
response to fears that ACTA might require seizures of generics in
transit, negotiating parties announced that “patents will not be
covered in the Section on Border Measures.”89 Excluding patent
infringements from the scope of Section 3 thus means that section’s
obligations do not apply to national border measures that extend to
goods suspected of patent infringements. For example, the obligation
under Article 13 that future ACTA parties should not unjustifiably
discriminate between IP rights in defining the scope of their national
border enforcement systems does not apply to patents.90 Hence, an
extension to cover patent infringements is not contravening Footnote
6 to the Border Measures Section.
However, this conclusion does not rule out the possibility that
extending border measures to patent infringements contravenes other
ACTA provisions, particularly in light of some of the free trade and
public health safeguards which ACTA negotiators borrowed from
TRIPS to alleviate public health concerns. In this context, ACTA
Article 6 is relevant: it is a verbatim copy of TRIPS Article 41(1) and
serves as an important safeguard against the creation of trade barriers
and against abusive reliance on IP enforcement measures in TRIPS.91
While Footnote 6 prevents the application of ACTA Section 3
obligations to patent rights, national border enforcement measures
which address patent infringement are not immune from the general
obligations ACTA imposes with respect to IP enforcement. For
example, the text of Article 6(1) refers to all IP enforcement
procedures available in national law and demands that “[t]hese
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation
of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against
their abuse.”92 Since this horizontal safeguard applies across the
board and so affects all ACTA obligations, its operation in the
context of transit seizures will be discussed separately in Part
III(C)(2).

89. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63.
90. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13.
91. See discussion supra Part II; see also discussion infra Part IV (discussing
the trade interests in generic drugs and Article 41(1) of the TRIPS Agreement).
92. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1).
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2. In-Transit Goods
The second controversy regarding the scope of border measures
under ACTA concerns the treatment of goods in transit, or in-transit
goods as they are now defined in the December 2010 final text.93
While ACTA Article 16 now contains a fairly clear rule, 94 earlier
drafts indicate the range of options that had been on the table among
the negotiating parties.95 This shows that anything beyond the
treatment of allegedly infringing imports was equally subject to
disagreement. Interestingly, certain combinations of a narrow scope
(covering only “suspected counterfeit trademark goods” and
“suspected pirated copyright goods”) and mere optional provisions
on transits and exports would arguably have resulted in a treaty
without a direct threat to generics in transit.96
In Article 16 of the December 2010 ACTA text, the negotiating
parties agreed that procedures must be available for customs
authorities, and right holders where appropriate, to suspend the
93. This version defines “in-transit” goods as those under “customs transit,”
defined as the “procedure under which goods are transported under customs
control from one customs office to another,” or “transshipment,” defined as the
“procedure under which goods are transferred from the importing means of
transport to the exporting means of transport within the area of one customs office
which is the office of both importation and exportation.” Id. art. 5(f), (i), (n).
94. See id. art. 16 (“A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to
suspect in-transit goods or in other situations where the goods are under customs
union control.”).
95. See, e.g., ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X (extending
to goods “imported, exported, in-transit or in other situations where the goods are
under customs supervision.”); see also id. art. 2.6, ¶ 1 (revealing other
permutations of similar draft language).
96. Compare id. (“1. Each Party shall provide procedures for import [and intransit] shipments and [may] [shall] provide procedures for export shipments, by
which right holders may request the competent authorities to suspend release of
suspected counterfeit trademark goods and suspected pirated copyright goods
[goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right] into free
circulation.”), with id. art. 2.X, ¶ 3 (“[Parties shall provide for the provisions
related to border measures to be applied [at least ]in cases of trade mark
counterfeiting and copyright piracy. [Parties may provide for such provisions to be
applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights.]]”). In the
July ACTA text, however, the brackets around the term “in-transit” under Option 1
are removed. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.6, ¶ 1 (citing
option 1). The July text contains a new Option 2, favored by the majority of the
negotiating parties, which is limited to counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright
goods, but applies to transit. Id.
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release of “import and export shipments.”97 On the other hand, the
second paragraph of this provision states that “[a] Party may adopt or
maintain procedures for suspect in-transit goods or in other situations
where the goods are under Customs control.”98 Based on the
permissive language of these provisions, ACTA does not obligate
contracting parties to introduce or maintain border measures against
any form of goods in transit. This again appears to be a significant
improvement from most of the options that were earlier on the
table—especially from the perspective of international trade in
generic medicines. Given that patents are completely excluded from
ACTA’s border measure section, and measures against transits are
merely optional rather than mandatory, one has to ask whether
ACTA still threatens in-transit generics. Before this question is
addressed in further detail below, the ACTA definitions pertaining to
transits must be assessed.
Article 5 in the December 2010 ACTA text contains three
definitions that are relevant here. First, the definition of the term “intransit goods” in Article 5(i) distinguishes between two modes of
transit: goods under “customs transit” and those under
“transshipment.”99 According to Article 5(f), “customs transit” is
“the customs procedure under which goods are transported under
customs control from one customs office to another.”100
“Transshipment” is in turn defined in Article 5(n) as “the customs
procedure under which goods are transferred under customs control
from the importing means of transport to the exporting means of
transport within the area of one customs office which is the office of
both importation and exportation.”101 The leaked ACTA draft of
January 2010 reveals that these terms and their definitions are based
97. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(1)(a)-(b).
98. Id. art.16(2) (emphasis added).
99. Id. art. 5(i). The current definition of “in-transit goods” appeared first in the
publicly released April 2010 ACTA draft text. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010,
supra note 57, art. 2.6, n.23 (referring to the bracketed inclusion of “in-transit”
goods under Option 1 of draft Article 2.6). This definition of “in-transit goods”
also appeared in the July ACTA draft text and the leaked draft text following the
Washington, D.C. round of negotiations. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra
note 58, art. 2.6 (defining “in-transit” goods in footnote 18); ACTA Draft—Aug.
25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.X (placing the definition of “in-transit” goods in
Article 1.X: Definitions, located in Chapter One, Section B).
100. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(f).
101. Id. art. 5(n).
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on the International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonization of Customs Procedures (“Kyoto Convention”).102
Until the final draft, it was questionable whether analyzing these
terms could provide any valuable insights on the general scope of the
notion of “transit” in ACTA, as it was not clear that all negotiating
parties favor such technical customs definitions.103 However, the
decision to move the definitions into a “General Definitions” section
implies consensus amongst the negotiating parties on their relevance
to the whole agreement.104
The implementation of technical customs law terms in ACTA
should be helpful to those authorities responsible for implementing
border measures, as they should be familiar with these terms. If one
applies the Kyoto Convention’s definitions to the case of transiting
generics, it appears that the second alternative definition of
“transshipment” in ACTA Article 5(n) is relevant: generic medicines
produced in one country and in transit through another on the way to
a third country of final destination are, after arrival in the transit
country, “transferred under customs control from the importing
means of transport to the exporting means of transport within the
area of one customs office.”105 The technical customs definitions thus
cover the typical scenarios that have led to the seizure of generics in
transit. Nevertheless, since it is not mandatory to extend border
measures to transits under the final December 2010 text, does ACTA
102. See ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 56, art. 2.6 n.10 (revealing
that Canada, New Zealand, and the United States proposed the inclusion of
“customs transit” and “transshipment” as defined by the Kyoto Convention).
103. It was doubtful whether all negotiating parties who used the term “intransit” or referred to goods in transit in more general terms—as the E.U. did in
Art.2.X:1-2 of the April 2010 ACTA Draft—relied on the same definition of
transit in their proposals. See, .e.g., ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57,
art. 1.X:1-2.
104. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.X. However, a
careful reading of the October 2010 ACTA text reveals that the definitions of “intransit goods,” “Customs transit,” and “transshipment,” contained in Article 1.X,
General Definitions, are not exactly the definitions used in the agreement itself.
See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010 supra note 60, art. 1.X. Instead, the draft language
in Article 2.X:2 regarding Border Measures uses the phrase “goods in transit or in
other situations where the goods are under Customs control.” Id. art. 2.X, ¶ 2
(emphasis added). The December draft addresses the discrepancy, which was most
likely the result of poor legal drafting, by aligning the terminology in Article 16 to
the definitions in Article 5. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, arts. 5, 16.
105. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 5(n).
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really continue to pose a significant threat for trade in generics?
The typical juridical answer is particularly apt in this case: it
depends. Distinct from TRIPS, ACTA explicitly allows parties to
provide “procedures for suspect goods in transit or in other situations
where the goods are under customs control.”106 Further, as mentioned
above, Article 2(1) of the December 2010 ACTA text generally
allows parties to implement more extensive protection, “provided
that such enforcement does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement.”107 In relation to extending border measures to cover
patent infringing goods, section 1 concludes that such “ACTA-plus”
enforcement procedures may contravene the agreement’s provisions,
particularly the safeguards against trade barriers and abuse set out in
the “General Obligations” Section.108 The same conclusion applies to
extending border measures to goods in transit, unless the explicit
allowance in ACTA Article 16(2) warrants a different result.109
One might argue that this explicit permission implies that making
use of this right (i.e. extending border measures to cover transits)
cannot be considered “contravening” ACTA. In principle, this is a
logically sound argument. However, while providing enforcement
procedures against goods in transit cannot be viewed as contravening
ACTA norms, certain methods of doing so certainly may
nevertheless contravene ACTA. The general obligation in ACTA
Article 6(1) that all enforcement procedures “shall be applied in such
a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and
to provide for safeguards against their abuse” also applies to cases
where ACTA explicitly allows certain measures. If a future ACTA
party decides to make use of this allowance, it must still ensure that it
106. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2). TRIPS, on the other
hand, states: “It is understood that there shall be no obligation to apply such
procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another country by or with the
consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit.” TRIPS Agreement art. 51 n.13;
see also Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-35 (opining that
while this may be viewed as some form of implicit allowance to extend border
measures to goods in transit, this view is contested); Kumar, supra note 26, at 51517 (discussing the conflicting scholarly interpretation of footnote 13 to TRIPS
Article 51).
107. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1).
108. Id. art. 6(1); see also discussion infra Part III(A)(3) (discussing the
operation of Article 6(1)).
109. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2).
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is doing so in a way that does not create trade barriers or allow
abuse. Hence, the option to provide border measures against goods in
transit is subject to the general obligation to do so in a manner that
does not create barriers to legitimate trade.110 An attempt to give a
more concrete meaning to the ambiguous terms used in the general
obligation provision can be found in Part III(C)(1).
3. Other Forms of IP Infringements
Another reason why the December 2010 ACTA text may still pose
a threat to international trade, particularly with respect to generic
medicines, is the fact that border measures apply not only to
counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright goods,111 but in principle
to all goods suspected of any other infringement of IP rights, except
patents and the protection of undisclosed information. This follows
from ACTA Article 6(1), which states that “[a] Party shall ensure
that enforcement procedures are available under its law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual
property rights covered by this Agreement .”112 The term “intellectual
property” is understood as comprising “all categories of intellectual
property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the

110. This may be especially relevant wherever procedures against transits are
combined with extending the IP-infringing goods covered, such as patent
infringing goods. The transit seizures subject to the WTO dispute brought by India
and Brazil indicate the trade distorting potential of such extended IP enforcement
regimes. See, e.g., India Consultation Request, supra note 2, at 2.
111. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51 (stating that members may adopt procedures
to allow right holders to file claims in respect of goods “which involve other
infringements of intellectual property rights” in conformity with the rest of the
agreement’s provisions). Earlier ACTA drafts contained proposals which similarly
mandated border measures “[at least] in cases of trademark counterfeiting and
copyright piracy.” ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X, (“Scope
of the Border Measures”) ¶ 3. The July 2010 ACTA text reveals that this provision
was the counter-proposal by the United States, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand,
Japan and Canada. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (“Scope of
the Border Measures”) ¶ 3. The provision further clarified that “[p]arties may
provide for such provisions to be applied in other cases of infringement of
intellectual property rights.” Id. In essence, the substance of the proposed Article
2.X:3 was identical with the scope of border measures as defined in the first
sentence of TRIPS Article 51. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. It therefore would not
have obliged contracting parties to provide border measures against goods
suspected of infringing patents, but explicitly allowed parties to do so.
112. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
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TRIPS Agreement.”113 Therefore, in general, border enforcement
procedures must extend to infringements of any IP rights provided in
the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed above, however, this is subject
to the exclusion of patent and test data rights by virtue of footnote 6
to the Border Measures Section.114 The remaining types of IP
infringements for which future ACTA parties must provide border
enforcement procedures thus cover, inter alia, all forms of trademark
infringements and infringing uses of geographical indications. Such a
broad scope of border measures permitted under ACTA had been
highly contentious amongst the negotiating parties, particularly with
respect to GIs.115
While extending border measures to goods suspected of infringing
GIs offers supporters of strong GI protection the opportunity to
impose their law on any goods transiting through their territory,116 for
trade in generic medicines this extension to all forms of trademark
infringements is particularly problematic. In earlier ACTA drafts,
this extension was explicitly addressed in a bracketed footnote,
which provided that:
[The provisions of this section shall also apply to confusingly similar
trademark goods [ which means any goods, including packaging, bearing
without authorization a trademark that is similar to the trademark validly
registered in respect of such or similar goods where there exists a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public between the trademark
borne and the trademark validly registered, and that thereby infringes the
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the

113. Id. art. 5(h).
114. Discussion supra Part III(A)(1).
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR
Releases Statement Regarding Recent ACTA Negotiations in New Zealand (Apr.
2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/ustrreleases-statement-regarding-recent-acta-negoti (stating that while the E.U. and
Switzerland favor a wide scope which covers goods protected by geographical
indications due to a perceived comparative advantage in the production and sale of
premium food and agricultural products associated with well known regions in
Europe, the United States and other “new world” countries desire a more limited
scope and advocate that GIs should be excluded).
116. If the substantive system of protection for GIs in the transit country
considers the mere transit as sufficient for infringement, without a threat of trade
diversion onto the domestic market, any in-transit good that uses similar or
identical terms may be subject to seizure.
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country in which the procedures set out in this Section are invoked.]117

Commentators have rightly pointed to the threat this poses to
transiting generic medicines: by relying on the same or similar words
identifying the active ingredient, the labels used to identify generics
often may be to some extent similar or close to the trademarks of the
original manufacturer.118 While a manufacturer may be expected to
take into account the scope of trademark protection in the country of
final destination, combining such a broad scope of border measures
with their optional extension to goods in transit imposes another
significant barrier to international trade. The generic producer would
need to distinguish its labeling from all protected trademarks in all
transit countries in order to ensure that the medicines are not seized
in transit. This in turn will increase transaction costs and may prevent
traders from using the most efficient transit routes. It hence adds
further barriers to the global trade in generics and the cheap
provision of medicines to populations in need.
Another troubling point is that custom authorities are not wellplaced to act against “confusingly similar trademark goods” in
general.119 Findings of likelihood of confusion based on the degree of
similarity of both the labels and the goods require a comprehensive
legal analysis which is much less straightforward than determining
whether goods are counterfeit.120 Such an assessment is typically
performed by courts or trademark offices, which have the necessary
117. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 n. 22; see also
ACTA Draft—Mar. 18, 2010, supra note 78, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 (revealing in footnote 9
that the extension of border measures to basically all forms of trademark
infringements was proposed by the E.U.); ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note
58, art. 2.X, ¶ 2 (indicating support from Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, and
Japan in footnote 16 that this provision apply to “confusingly similar trademark
goods”).
118. See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. U. WASH. C.
L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/
go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(“Extending border suspensions and goods destructions to mere trademark
infringements should be particularly worrying for generic medicines
manufacturers.”).
119. See Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA Australian Section-by-Section Analysis
(April Public Draft), 28 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=kimweatherall (expressing a concern
that a determination of whether a trademark is “confusingly similar” is difficult).
120. See id.
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legal expertise, case law, and experience to rely upon. Imposing this
task on customs officers is likely to result in a considerable increase
in seizures and temporary detentions based on right holder
allegations that transiting generics are confusingly similar. Until the
generic producer or subsequent owner of the goods is able to show
that no likelihood of confusion exists or that the goods do not pose
any threat of being diverted into domestic markets,121 the goods will
be detained for the time being because ACTA Article 17 allows
initial detentions based on evidence for prima facie trademark
infringement, judged by “the law of the Party providing the
procedures.”122 ACTA Article 19 then requires contracting parties,
acting through competent authorities, to initiate proceedings to
determine the existence of an infringement “within a reasonable
period of time.”123 Even though there is a good chance that in-transit
generics will subsequently be found by a court not to infringe
trademarks in the transit country,124 ACTA does not generally allow
the goods to be released against provision of a security.125 In general,
the goods will therefore remain detained until a court has decided on
the infringement issue. Given the duration of court proceedings, such
detention periods will likely pose another considerable obstacle to
international trade in generic medicines.126
121. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the situation in countries
where such a requirement in the substantive trademark law may provide a ground
for releasing the goods due to the absence of substantive infringement).
122. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1); see discussion infra
Part III(B)(2) (analyzing the “choice of law” rule).
123. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19. ACTA does not contain
any provision similar to Article 55 of TRIPS which limits the initial detention
period to 10 days. TRIPS Agreement art. 55; see also discussion infra Part
IV(A)(3) (discussing ACTA Article 19’s consistency with the TRIPS Agreement).
124. See discussion infra Part III(B)(1) (discussing the decisive question of
whether goods merely in transit are likely to be considered as infringing based on
the law of the transit country).
125. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18 (“A Party may, only
in exceptional circumstances or pursuant to a judicial order, permit a defendant to
post a bond or other security to obtain possession of suspect goods .”). In
comparison, Article 53(2) of the TRIPS Agreement in turn explicitly requires that,
for certain forms of alleged IP infringements, the owner/importer of the goods
must have the option of posting a security in order to have the goods released.
TRIPS Agreement art. 53; see also discussion infra Part IV(A)(3) (discussing the
TRIPS consistency of ACTA Article 18).
126. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (discussing whether such trade barriers
may be tackled under the new proposal in the General Obligations section of
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Finally, another form of IP rights contained in the TRIPS
Agreement that is related to pharmaceutical products is the
protection of test data under Article 39(3).127 Although footnote 6 to
the Border Measures Section generally excludes the protection of
undisclosed information from its scope,128 the arguments above show
that ACTA parties nevertheless may provide for enforcement
measures against goods that are suspected of infringing their
domestic test data protection system.129 In case they also extend their
border measures to goods in transit, the question then arises whether
generics may run the risk of being considered as infringing test data
protection in the transit country. If so, this form of protection could
be argued as functioning as a trade barrier for generics in transit.
However, the protection of test data against unfair commercial use
concerns data submitted to regulatory authorities in order to obtain
marketing approval for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical
products—not the goods produced as a consequence of using this
data.130 Even TRIPS-plus test data exclusivity regimes in national
laws are highly unlikely to extend protection to generics from
abroad: while the test data relevant to the marketing approval may be
protected in the country of transit, generics produced elsewhere do
not aim for marketing approval in the transit country even if the
production occurred in reliance on this data. Hence, extending border
measures to test data protection does not seem to pose a threat to
international trade in generics.
4. Options to Limit the Scope of Border Measures
As previous sections have demonstrated, ACTA’s negotiating
parties have tried to alleviate concerns over transit seizures and
ACTA, which includes the text of TRIPS Article 41 verbatim).
127. See TRIPS Agreement art. 39(3) (stating that Members must protect test
data against disclosure, unless necessary to protect the public or unless steps are
taken to avoid unfair commercial use).
128. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13, n.6.
129. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(2).
130. The subject matter of the protection under TRIPS is undisclosed
information contained in written material which details the results of scientific
health and safety testing of drugs and agrochemicals, in relation to human, animal
and plant health, impact on the environment, and efficacy of use. TRIPS
Agreement art. 39(3). See generally CORREA, supra note 38, at 32; G. Lee
Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 7 (2003).
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access to medicines in the final December 2010 ACTA text.
Nevertheless, some problems remain. ACTA generally allows parties
to provide border measures against goods in transit and it requires
future contracting parties to extend border enforcement to types of
suspected IP infringements which carry the potential to create
barriers to the trade in generic medicines. This raises the question of
whether the chapeau provision in ACTA Article 13 may be utilized
to limit this potential. It states:
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic system of
intellectual property rights protection and without prejudice to the
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, for effective border enforcement
of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights and that
avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.131

In particular, Article 13 might be applied to exclude those ordinary
forms of trademark infringement that have been identified in section
c above as tools to temporarily detain goods in transit until a court in
the transit country has ruled on the matter.
ACTA Article 13 has neither a ‘predecessor’ in earlier drafts, nor a
counterpart in the TRIPS Agreement. Subject to certain conditions,
the provision allows ACTA parties to exclude IP infringement from
the scope of domestic border enforcement systems.132 It appears to
primarily serve as a compromise tool bridging the differences
between the E.U. and the United States over covering infringements
of GIs and other IP rights beyond the minimum standards contained
in TRIPS Article 51.133 The provision contains several open and
ambiguous terms and conditions,134 which in sum create a form of
131. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13.
132. See id. (stipulating that a party can effect policies regarding border
enforcement and IP rights so long as they are consistent with its domestic IP rights
regime and is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement).
133. Compare id. art. 13 (stating that a party should promulgate border measures
that do not “unjustifiably” discriminate), with ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra
note 60, art. 2.X (stating that a party should promulgate border measures that do
not “unreasonably” discriminate). The fact that, in the October 2010 text version,
the equivalent provision contained one of the very few remaining terms which
were still disputed amongst the parties (“unreasonably” rather than the current
“unjustifiably”) supports the view that this provision was part of a compromise
between the United States and the E.U.
134. Ambiguous terms in Article 13 include “discriminate unjustifiably,” “as
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constructive ambiguity that disguises the remaining differences
amongst the parties over the treaty text.135 Instead, each party will be
able justify its own understanding by relying on a favorable
interpretation of one or more of these terms. While this constructive
ambiguity may have been primarily created to allow the negotiating
parties to take different approaches to address infringements of
geographical indications, it may equally serve as an appropriate tool
to exclude ordinary trademark infringements from a national system
of border measures.
The basic obligation which Article 13 repeats is to provide “for
effective border enforcement of intellectual property rights,”136
subject to several requirements. For instance, a Party’s acts must be
“consistent with [its] domestic system of intellectual property rights
protection” and “without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement.”137 The first phrase clarifies that enforcement measures
apply only insofar as the ACTA party’s domestic system of
substantive IP protection considers the goods potentially
infringing.138 Hence, for ordinary trademark infringements, border
measures must, in principle, be available. The second phrase ensures
that future ACTA parties are bound by the minimum standards of
border enforcement prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement.139 It equally
appropriate,” “legitimate trade,” “and “consistent with a parties domestic system of
intellectual property rights protection.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60,
art. 13.
135. See Henning M. Grosse Ruse - Khan, The Role of Chairman’s Statements
in the WTO, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 475, 491-92 (2007) (positing that “constructive
ambiguity” allowed all sides to come to an agreement at the cost of specificity).
136. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13. This basic obligation is
already contained in Article 6. See id. art. 6(1) (“Each Party shall ensure that
enforcement procedures are available under its law so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement”); see also discussion supra Part (II)(A)(3).
137. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13.
138. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the relationship of ACTA
with domestic IP protection laws). Compare ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra
note 60, art. 13 (“In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its domestic
system of intellectual property rights protection .”), with id. art. 3(1) (“This
Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions in a Party’s law governing the
availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of intellectual property rights.”).
139. See id. art. 13. In applying this provision, for example, a future party may
not, exclude border measures against counterfeit trademark and pirated copyright
goods as demanded by TRIPS Article 51 when introducing limits to the types of IP
infringements covered.
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upholds all minimum requirements that safeguard the interests of
traders and owners of the goods potentially subject to border
measures.140 This condition does not prevent future parties from
excluding ordinary trademark infringements from its border IP
enforcement system as long as counterfeit trademark goods are still
covered, as defined in footnote 13 to TRIPS Article 51.
The main discretionary element of Article 13, then, is that a party
can provide for such effective border measures “as appropriate.”
Within the boundaries mentioned above, this seems to offer ample
flexibility to limit the types of infringements covered.141 This
discretion is further limited only slightly by the call that parties
“should do so in a manner that does not discriminate unjustifiably
between intellectual property rights and that avoids the creation of
barriers to legitimate trade.”142 Here, the use of the permissive
“should” instead of the mandatory “shall” is a decisive factor in that
it does not create a new obligation under international law.143 The
second element concerning the avoidance of trade barriers would
actually militate in favor of limiting border measures in a way that
does not threaten trade in generic medicines.144 Under the first
element, unjustifiable discrimination should be avoided but
justifiable distinctions between types of infringements where good
faith reasons validate a different treatment are certainly allowed.
Here, access to medicines and international trade in generic
medicines and other goods can serve as justifications to exclude
140. Id. In application, this provision would uphold TRIPS Articles 41, 55, and
56. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 41, 53, 55, 56; see also discussion infra Part
IV(A)(3) (discussing potential conflicts between ACTA and the TRIPS
Agreement).
141. The notion of effectiveness does not preclude such findings. In the
preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, the negotiating parties expressed their intention
“[to provide] effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related
intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in their respective legal
systems and practices.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl.
(emphasis added). This strongly indicates that the notion of effectiveness must
nevertheless give deference to variances among the national enforcement systems.
142. See id. art. 13.
143. See GERVAIS, supra note 39, at 203 (discussing the use of the word
“should” in TRIPS Article 7 and stating that it should not be viewed as reducing
the scope of “shall”).
144. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (analyzing TRIPS Article 41(1)). TRIPS
Article 41(1) is the equivalent provision of Article 13 in ACTA, even though the
former is phrased as a “shall” obligation.
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ordinary trademark infringements, especially if the country has
introduced border measures against goods in transit. The chapeau
provision in ACTA Article 13 therefore allows for the exclusion of
those types of infringements from a domestic system of border
measures that are particularly problematic for generic drugs in
transit. The general obligation to create such measures for ordinary
trademark infringements is therefore also waived so long as such
exclusion can be justified on public health grounds.
In sum, the scope of the ACTA border measures section allows
parties to prevent the seizure of generic medicines. However,
countries have to implement the agreement with all of these options
in mind in order to take public health issues into account.

B. APPLICABLE LAW AND DETERMINATION OF INFRINGEMENT
This section assesses two related general aspects of the December
2010 ACTA text that may affect international trade in generics. The
border measures section in ACTA contains rules on the applicable
law governing the determination of the IP-infringing character of
goods subject to border measures. Section 1 below contrasts the
relevant ACTA provision with that of the TRIPS Agreement and
highlights its impact on international trade in generics. Furthermore,
ACTA, as an agreement on the enforcement of IP rights, claims not
to set its own standards of IP protection and does not prescribe which
acts contracting parties shall treat as infringements of their national
laws. It contains a general rule, however, on the relationship between
the applicable national IP infringement standards and the IP
enforcement obligations under ACTA. Section 2 examines the
operation of this rule for cases of generics in transit.
1. The Applicable Law in IP Border Enforcement Cases
In principle, a system for the enforcement of IP rights such as
border measures is a system of procedural law as distinguished from
substantive law. However, the international character of global trade
and its natural connection to the territories and markets of several
countries makes it useful, if not necessary, to include a rule on which
a nation’s substantive law shall apply. The applicable law then
primarily determines whether the goods in question infringe on IP
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rights.145 As the Dutch transit seizure cases have shown, the national
laws of the country of production, of transit, and of destination
certainly may have different answers here.146 A choice of law rule
that decides which substantive law is relevant will therefore be
crucial for determining the existence of an IP infringement.
Under TRIPS, the choice of law rule obliges WTO Members to
require from right holders applying for the seizure of goods
“adequate evidence to satisfy the competent authorities that, under
the laws of the country of importation, there is prima facie an
infringement of the right holder’s intellectual property right.”147
Thus, the relevant law determining whether the goods in question are
prima facie infringing is that of the country of importation.148 This
choice is arguably driven by two considerations. First, since TRIPS
merely obliges WTO members to provide border measures against
imports, the authorities and courts charged to rule on the infringing
nature of goods will likely be those of the importing country. Of
course, applying one’s own law to judge IP infringements will make
things much easier. In principle, however, the application of a
foreign law is always a possible alternative, both under general
doctrines of private international law as well as under the generally
accepted choice of law rule for IP rights.149 Second, since the goods
145. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (discussing the problem of determining
infringement and establishing the role of the scope of the applicable substantive IP
law).
146. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the seizure by the Dutch of generic
drugs in transit and the conflict among several substantive IP regimes).
147. See TRIPS Agreement art. 52.
148. Id. In addition, TRIPS refers to the law of the importing country to
determine goods that contain counterfeit trademarks or copyright piracy. See id.
art. 51 n.14.
149. One common theory in private international law calls for the application of
the law of the country which has the strongest territorial link or connection to the
legal issue to be decided. Other theories examine all potentially applicable norms
and ask which has the strongest and most valid interest to be applied (government
interest analysis). In both instances, this may be a foreign territory and a foreign
rule. The application of the principle of lex loci protectionis to determine the law
applicable to the protection of a certain subject matter by IP rights can also lead to
the application of a foreign law as soon as IP protection for a foreign territory is
sought. Article 5(2) of the Revised Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works confirms this for the area of copyright law by determining that
‘‘the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where
protection is claimed.’’ Berne Convention, supra note 33, art. 5(2) (emphasis
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are to be sold or otherwise commercialized on the market of the
importing country, understood as the country of final destination,150
there is generally a strong link to that country, justifying the
application of its law.151
The December 2010 ACTA text contains a provision equivalent to
TRIPS Article 52, which states:
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities shall require a right
holder that requests the procedures described in subparagraphs 1(b) and
2(b) of Article 16 (Border Measures) to provide adequate evidence to
satisfy the competent authorities that, under the law of the Party providing
the procedures, there is prima facie an infringement of the right holder’s
intellectual property right.152

Despite its similarly to TRIPS, the applicable law rule is different
in ACTA: instead of the country of importation, the relevant
benchmark for judging whether goods are IP-infringing is “the law of
the Party providing the procedures,”153 meaning the domestic IP law
added). For the question of applicable law in the context of private international
law, this rule is frequently cited to justify the application of the law of the country
where an act conflicts with IP rights granted by the domestic law and on this basis
protection is sought (lex loci protections). For the area of patent law, one can refer
to Article 4bis (1) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property:
‘‘Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by national of countries
of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in
other countries, whether members of the Union or not.’’ Paris Convention, supra
note 33, art. 4(1); see CORREA, supra note 38, at 81 (expressing that this principle
of independence of patents builds on and presupposes the principle of
territoriality).
150. See Kumar, supra note 26, at 510-17 (discussing the relation of the term
“country of importation” in the context of other relevant articles of TRIPS); Grosse
Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36 (interpreting the meaning of the
term “country of importation”).
151. Kumar, supra note 26, at 512-17 (indicating that other provisions in TRIPS
suggest that an essential element of importation into a country is the likelihood and
possibility of the goods entering the channels of commerce in [the] country.).
152. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1).
153. The definitions of “counterfeit trademark goods” and “pirated copyright
goods” in the definitions section of ACTA further confirm this applicable law rule.
See id. art. 5(d), (k) (stating that whether goods are counterfeit or pirated is to be
judged “under the law of the country in which the procedures set forth in Chapter
II (Legal Framework for Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights) are
invoked.”). These differ in the same aspect from the otherwise identical provisions
in footnote 14 to TRIPS Article 51. TRIPS Agreement art. 51 n.14 (announcing
only that counterfeit or pirated goods are to be judged under the law of the country
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of the authorities adopting the border measures. For measures taken
against imported goods, nothing changes: they are still judged by the
law of the importing country since the relevant authorities are those
of the importing country. For goods in transit, however, the
applicable law is no longer that of the country of importation or final
destination, but instead that of the country where the goods are
seized by customs in transit, namely the transit country.154
As the Dutch transit seizure cases illustrate, this change in the
choice of law rule can have severe consequences.155 In those cases,
the law of the transit country was applied to determine whether the
drugs in transit are IP-infringing even though there was no IP
infringement in the countries of origin and production or the
countries of importation and final destination.156 Although some have
argued otherwise,157 this rule is, at least formally, consistent with the
notion that IP rights are territorial in nature.158 A broad definition of
of importation).
154. See Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36 (addressing the
question of whether the TRIPS Agreement takes a more specific approach by
defining the “laws of the country of importation” as applying only to the country of
final destination); discussion infra Part IV(B) (discussing whether the transit
country rule is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement).
155. See discussion supra Part I (describing how the Dutch seizure of generic
medicines to treat hypertension and HIV/AIDS, among other diseases, prevented
the medicines from reaching their destination in developing countries in South
America and Africa).
156. See discussion supra Part II(B) (explaining that Dutch authorities seized the
generic medicines under E.U. and Dutch border measures, a choice of law rule
which arguably contradicts the TRIPS approach of making border measures
dependent on evidence of IP infringements based on the law of the country of
importation).
157. See, e.g., India Consultation Request, supra note 2, ¶ 3 (reading the TRIPS
Agreement and Doha Declaration to mean that “the rights conferred on the owner
of a patent cannot be extended to interfere with the freedom of transit of generic
drugs lawfully manufactured within, and exported from, India”); Frederick M.
Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of
Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public
Welfare, 1 WIPO J. 43, 49 (2009) (arguing that the decision of the E.U. to apply
European laws to goods in transit constitutes a denial of “the sovereign rights of
foreign WTO Members” to grant their own patents).
158. See L. BENTLY & B. SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 929 (2d ed.
2004) (stating that under the principle of territoriality, the existence and scope of
IP protection in relation to acts committed on domestic territory depends on the
domestic law); CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AGREEMENTS: GLOBALIZING LAW THROUGH SERVICES AND INTELLECTUAL
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territoriality may allow minimal territorial linkages, such as the
transit of goods through a country, to be treated as a sufficient
expression of territoriality by the law of the transit country. Thus,
such minimal territorial connections can be used as the relevant
connecting factor for a choice of law rule, even though the goods
may have a much stronger connection to the territory of another
country, for example, the country in which the goods will be sold or
otherwise commercialized.159 Notwithstanding the consistency of the
choice of law rule with the territorial nature of IP laws, the existence
of these comparably stronger territorial linkages have sparked many
scholars to criticize laws with a minimal link as “extraterritorial” in
reach.160
PROPERTY 30 (2000); INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TREATIES 3 (Alfredo Ilardi & Michael Blakeney eds., 2004) (explaining
that while international IP law heavily influences domestic legislation, global IP
rights are nevertheless “a bundle of nationally enforceable rights”); Paul
Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, in 18 IIC STUDIES
IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM GATT TO TRIPS 1, 3-5
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (asserting that the domestic
nature of the protection of IP rights effectively constitutes a non-tariff restriction
on trade and illustrating how this type of restriction operates in the context of
pirated goods). But see Annette Kur, A New Framework for Intellectual Property
Rights Horizontal Issues, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 7
(2004) (discussing the “erosion of the territoriality principle” in light of the global
dimension of IP rights, and calling for the development of new mechanisms to
resolve cross-border IP disputes).
159. Unless international harmonization via multilateral treaties on conflict of
law rules has circumscribed national autonomy to determine which connecting
factors trigger the applicable law, countries enjoy freedom to decide how to define
the notion of territoriality and the necessary linkages of conducts or persons to its
territory.
160. See Abbott, supra note 15 (noting that transit of goods through EU airports
“involves minimal jurisdictional contract with EU territory,” and arguing that “[i]t
is an extreme concept of trade regulation to suggest that goods in transit must
comply with ordinary local regulatory requirements in order to avoid confiscation
by local customs authorities”); see also Josef Drexl, Lex Americana ante portas
Zur Extraterritorialen Anwendung nationalen [Lex Americana ante portas The
Extraterritorial Application of National Law], in URHEBERRECHT IM
INFORMATIONSZEITALTER [COPYRIGHT IN THE INFORMATION AGE] 429 (Ulrich
Loewenheim ed., 1999); Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean?
The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 34950 (2008) (discussing the recent trend in the extraterritorial application of domestic
IP laws by countries that “fear insufficient IP protection for the intellectual assets
of their companies abroad” in lieu of working towards harmonization of IP laws
through international agreements).
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For generics in transit, the applicable law rule in ACTA allows the
transit country to apply its own law to determine whether goods in
transit infringe on IP rights. While not all transit countries may
consider the mere transit of goods as IP infringing,161 the applicable
law rule nonetheless creates uncertainty and legal insecurity for all
international trade in goods: the owners and traders in generic
medicines now have to consider the choice of law rules and
substantive laws of all transit countries in order to find out whether it
is “safe” to use a specific transit route.
2. Determination of Infringement
Given ACTA’s applicable law rule, the question arises how to
determine an infringement of IP rights under ACTA. In this regard,
the December 2010 ACTA text provides:
ARTICLE 19: DETERMINATION AS TO INFRINGEMENT
Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures by which its competent
authorities may determine, within a reasonable period of time after the
initiation of the procedures described under Article 16 (Border Measures),
whether the suspect goods infringe an intellectual property right.162

Whether one of the remedies specified in ACTA is available first
depends on the finding that the goods are infringing in accordance
with the procedures adopted pursuant to Article 19.163 However, as a
treaty concerned with the enforcement of IP rights, ACTA does not
set its own substantive standards in regards to the infringement of IP
rights.164 Instead, Article 3(2) provides the general rule on the
161. See discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (elaborating on the determination of
infringement).
162. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19 (emphasis added).
163. Id. art. 20(1), (3) (providing that competent authorities may destroy goods
or impose administrative penalties “following a determination referred to in Article
19 that the goods are infringing”) (emphasis added).
164. Id. art. 3(1) (confirming that ACTA’s provisions shall not be understood as
setting new or distinct standards of substantive IP protection, other than those
available under the domestic laws of future ACTA parties). Apart from specific
instances in which ACTA enforcement obligations arguably set de facto new
standards of substantive IP enforcement, for example, regarding copyright
protection on the internet, this is a crucial difference between ACTA and the
TRIPS Agreement. In the latter, the general obligation in IP enforcement requires
“that enforcement procedures are available so as to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement.”
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relationship between the procedural rules mandated under ACTA and
the substantive standards of IP protection under which states
determine infringements—“[ACTA] does not create any obligation
on a Party to apply measures where a right in intellectual property is
not protected under its laws and regulations.”165 The decisive
question of whether goods are IP infringing thus depends on the
substantive IP protection standards in domestic law.166 In situations
where no substantive IP protection exists according to domestic law,
there is per se no obligation to establish IP enforcement measures.
Put another way, ACTA does not require contracting parties to
enforce border measures against goods that do not infringe domestic
IP rights. Countries that do not consider transit as an act infringing a
patent, trademark, or copyright protected under their national IP
systems would therefore not be obliged to seize these goods, even if
their systems of IP border enforcement would generally extend to
patent infringements as well as goods in transit.167
Thus, the final fate of allegedly infringing goods in transit depends
on whether the substantive scope of IP protection in the transit
country actually covers transit as an infringing act. In other words,
would the domestic IP law consider acts with a marginal territorial
link to the transit country as infringements or does it demand a real
and proven threat of trade diversion in the market of the transit
country? A recent decision of the English Court of Appeals raised
precisely this question, analyzing whether the BMR encompasses
TRIPS Agreement art. 41(1) (emphasis added). The verbatim copying of this
provision into ACTA Article 6(1) is apparently the result of poor legal drafting
since this provision is directly contradicted by Article 3. ACTA Text—Dec. 3,
2010, supra note 60, arts. 3, 6(1).
165. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 3(2). The development of
Article 3(2) is traceable to the April 21, 2010 draft. See ACTA Draft—Apr. 21,
2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X n.21 (Scope of the Border Measures) (“No Party shall
be obliged to apply this section to any goods that do not infringe an intellectual
property right held within the territory of that Party. [Negotiator’s note: Study
moving to General Provisions section.]”).
166. As the previous section has shown, it is the law of the contracting party that
governs the applicable procedures. The question discussed in this section is related,
but a distinct one since it deals with the scope of ACTA and whether it sets out
new standards of IP infringement.
167. One can further argue that this follows as a general rule also from the
requirement for prima facie evidence for an “infringement of the right holder’s
intellectual property right.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1)
(emphasis added).
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goods in transit.168 On this question, the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) has previously held that trademark ownership in the country
of transit did not justify interference with the transit procedure unless
the “goods are subject to the act of a third party while they are placed
under the external transit procedure which necessarily entails their
being put on the market in the Member State of transit.”169 The ECJ
also clarified that the risk of deviance to the transit market must be
manifest, stating specifically that the possibility that “they could
theoretically be marketed fraudulently” is insufficient to support the
trademark owner’s application under the BMR.170 In sum, the rightholder must offer concrete evidence for a substantiated threat of trade
diversion in order to show the infringement of trademarks in the
transit country (which in turn triggers the application of border
measures).171
Other ACTA parties, however, may certainly take a different
position here. Often the substantive scope of protection will vary
according to type of IP right in question: while a country may
demand a concrete threat of trade diversion for trademark
infringement, it may consider any form of transit sufficient for the
infringement of other IP rights, or may not view any transiting goods
as potentially infringing in other cases. For generic drugs in transit,
the availability of potential remedies, such as seizure and destruction
of goods under ACTA,172 depends on whether, and under what
conditions, the domestic IP law of the country providing the border
measures considers transits as potentially infringing. On one hand,
this seems to reduce the risk for border measure remedies against
transiting generics as patent or trademark infringing goods since few
countries are likely to apply such a broad notion of protection for an
168. Case C-495/09, Nokia Corp. v. HM Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs,
2010 O.J. (C 37) 22, 22; Nokia Corp. v. HM Comm’rs of Revenue & Customs,
[2009] EWHC (Ch) 1903 (Eng.).
169. Case C-281/05, Montex Holdings Ltd v. Diesel SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-10897,
¶ 23. The ECJ made similar judgments in other cases. See, e.g., Case C-405/03,
Class Int’l BV v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 2005 E.C.R. I-8761, ¶ 50; Case C383/98, Polo/Lauren Co. v. PT. Dwidua Langgeng Pratama Int’l Freight
Forwarders, 2000 E.C.R. I-2531, ¶ 34.
170. Montex Holdings Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. ¶ 24.
171. For a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s case law in the context of E.U.
seizures of generics in transit, see Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at
510-19.
172. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 20.
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IP right to transit cases that lack any real link to their territory. On
the other hand, under ACTA, authorities in the transit country may
detain generics merely “suspected” of infringing domestic IP rights
until a court decision on that question has been issued.173 This is
because ACTA allows right holders to request the suspension of
goods if they can provide prima facie evidence of infringements of
their rights.174 Until customs have clarified whether an alleged threat
of trade diversion really exists, goods are unlikely to be released.175
Moreover, if the right-holder and the owner of the goods dispute the
facts underlying the case for trade diversion, the goods may not be
released until the matter has been resolved in a court.176 The E.U. and
Dutch seizures demonstrate the likelihood of such scenarios arising.
Even if goods are released after a certain period of time, this
temporary detention poses a significant obstacle to free transit and
the international trade in generic medicines. This result further
introduces great legal insecurity and uncertainty for traders and users
of generic medicines. In sum, ACTA Article 3(2) does not provide
sufficient safeguards against seizures of generics in transit.

C. ACTA SAFEGUARDS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND AGAINST TRADE
BARRIERS
Sections III(A) and (B) above have analyzed the potential threat
that the ACTA border measures pose for international trade for
generics in transit in particular. While negotiators have taken some
important steps to address the matter, the December 2010 ACTA text
still seems to allow seizures of goods in transit suspected of
“ordinary” trademark infringement in the transit country. This
section now examines the efficacy of relevant safeguards
incorporated into the December 2010 ACTA text. Do the mandated
border measures prevent trade barriers and protect public health
173. See id. arts. 16, 19. Article 19 specifies that this determination must be
made within a “reasonable period.” Earlier drafts contained specific maximum
periods for initial detentions until determination of infringement. See, e.g., ACTA
Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.6, ¶ 3 (showing that the negotiating
parties favored a maximum detention period of one year, with the exception of
Singapore, who favored a maximum period of sixty days).
174. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1).
175. Note, however, that detained goods may be released against posting of a
bond or other security. Id. art. 18.
176. Id. art. 19.
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concerns? In particular, do the safeguards prevent seizures of
generics in transit from (re-)occurring?
1. Interpretation Based on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8
The July draft text of ACTA offers opportunities for a public
interest focused interpretation of the ACTA treaty terms.177 Initially,
the text of Article 1.X was a verbatim copy of Articles 7 and 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement, provisions that have been identified as key
TRIPS flexibilities affecting the interpretation and implementation of
all TRIPS provisions.178 Then, in the August 2010 ACTA draft, the
newly inserted preamble contained a verbatim copy of the TRIPS
text in brackets and also provided that the contracting parties are
“[d]etermined to implement this Agreement in a manner consistent
with the objectives and principles set out in the TRIPS Agreement
.”179
Now, the final December 2010 ACTA text provides: “The
objectives and principles set forth in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement,
in particular in Articles 7 and 8 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this
Agreement.”180 In addition, in the relevant part of the December 2010
text of the ACTA preamble the negotiating parties agree to ACTA:

177. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 1.X (text proposed by
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Canada) (stating that IP rights should be
enforced in a manner consistent with “the promotion of technological innovation,”
and that parties may “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition” and other sectors in the public interest). But see id. art. 1.X, ¶ 3
(revealing that Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and the United States requested the
deletion of language regarding the abuse of IP rights while the E.U. wished to
incorporate the principles of the provision into the ACTA preamble).
178. See generally Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, Proportionality and Balancing
Within the Objectives for Intellectual Property Protection, in 18 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161, 185 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008) (noting
that “one of the TRIPS flexibilities is the right of individual WTO Members to
interpret TRIPS in light of its purpose” as expressed in Articles 7 and 8); Peter K.
Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979,
1018-46 (2009) (discussing the ways in which Articles 7 and 8 guide interpretation
of the TRIPS Agreement, can also be used to challenge the aggressive expansion
and enforcement of IP rights, and spark development of new international IP
norms).
179. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, pmbl.
180. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(3).
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Recognizing the principles set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, adopted on November 14, 2001, by the WTO at
the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar;181

The TRIPS provisions incorporated in ACTA state:
Article 7 Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
Article 8 Principles
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.182

Against the background of their interpretative role,183 the question
arises whether the incorporation of these provisions by reference can
have the same impact on ACTA treaty interpretation. One way to
shed light on this question is by analyzing an ACTA provision that,
if interpreted widely, may be pertinent in the context of transit
seizures. In relevant part, Article 18 states that “a Party may, only in
exceptional circumstances or pursuant to a judicial order, permit a
defendant to post a bond or other security to obtain possession of
suspect goods.”184 The question then is what would constitute
181. Id. pmbl.
182. TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8.
183. For a general discussion on the role of Article 7 and 8 in TRIPS, see
Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO
Law 2 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309526.
184. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18 (emphasis added). The
provision stems from a bracketed footnote in an earlier draft stating that “where the
competent authorities suspend the release of suspected counterfeit trademark or
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“exceptional circumstances?” Could this provision function as a
public health safeguard that allows the release of generics in transit
against posting of a security, for example, if the traders or recipients
of the medicines can make a case for a good faith public health use
of the drugs?
On one hand, in the likely event that the term “exceptional
circumstances” is interpreted narrowly, this would only allow for a
marginal scope of application in general. On the other hand, an
interpretation based on TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 may lead to different
results. Therefore, the central question hence is whether the
incorporation of these TRIPS provisions can perform a similar
interpretative function in ACTA. In that case, any open and
ambiguous terms in ACTA, including “exceptional circumstances,”
would have to be interpreted in light of the balancing objectives and
public interest principles expressed in the TRIPS provisions. Such an
interpretation then can assume the existence of exceptional
circumstances whenever public health and access to medicines
concerns speak for the release of goods in transit, even if they are IP
infringing in the transit country.185
As mentioned above, ACTA’s negotiating parties recognized the
principles set out in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health in the preamble to the December draft,186 which provides a
strong argument that these principles should control interpretation of
ACTA provisions. The Doha Declaration indicates that TRIPS
pirated copyright goods, the authorities shall not permit the goods to be released
into free circulation, exported, or subject to other customs procedures, except in
exceptional circumstances.” ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, n.24.
The July ACTA text reveals that United States and Japan were the main supporters
of this provision. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, n.19. In the ACTA
draft that leaked after the Washington, D.C. round of negotiations, the language
was moved to the provision dealing with remedies. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010,
supra note 59, art. 2.11. The next iteration of the provision appeared in what would
be close to its final form. ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2.9.
185. A similar result may be obtained by a public health motivated interpretation
of the term “due cause.” ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(4).
That provision concerns certain options to deny right holder applications for
seizures of allegedly infringing goods and states “a Party may provide that, where
the applicant has abused the process, or where there is due cause, its competent
authorities have the authority to deny, suspend, or void an application.” Id.
(emphasis added).
186. See id. pmbl.
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should be interpreted and implemented “in a manner supportive of
WTO members’ right to protect public health.”187 WTO members
recognized that the expressed “objectives and principles” guide
interpretation of the Agreement, in accordance with “customary rules
of interpretation of public international law.”188 The recognition of
these principles of treaty interpretation in ACTA, therefore, indicates
that the drafters intended to give TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 the same
interpretative weight as WTO members agreed to in the Doha
Declaration.
Further support for such a result comes from the customary rules
of treaty interpretation in international law. Under the general rules
of treaty interpretation embodied in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), a treaty’s object and purpose is one main
element for understanding its provisions.189 ACTA does not contain a
provision explicitly entitled “Objectives;” therefore, ACTA’s object
and purpose is arguably defined through ACTA’s incorporation of
TRIPS Articles 7 and 8. In other words, the balancing objectives and
public interest principles embodied in Articles 7 and 8 function as
the main objectives of ACTA, which strongly support a broad
interpretation of the term “exceptional circumstances” oriented
towards public health.
Another aspect of the principles on treaty interpretation offers
additional arguments for taking public health perspectives into
account. The VCLT provides that treaty interpretation may also be
guided by any relevant international law that applies to the parties.190
This could be a basis for taking access to medicine considerations
into account, flowing from the right to health as embodied in the

187. Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 4.
188. Id. ¶ 5(a).
189. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, A Real
Partnership for Development? Sustainable Development as Treaty Objective in
European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L.
139, 163-66 (2010) (explaining the role of “object and purpose” when interpreting
treaties in international economic law).
190. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31(3)(c); see also Campbell McLachlan, The
Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention,
54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005) (proposing that Article 31(3)(c) expresses
a value of “systemic integration” in international law).
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.191
Such an “integrative” interpretation, however, should be seen as a
safeguard of last resort.192 Here, the incorporation of Articles 7 and 8
of the TRIPS Agreement offer sufficient means to take public health
considerations into account when interpreting open and ambiguous
ACTA terms such as “exceptional circumstances.”193
The example therefore proves the point that the same balancing
objectives and public interest principles which guide treaty
interpretation in relation to the TRIPS Agreement apply in the ACTA
context. At the same time, treaty interpretation is equally affected by
the ordinary meaning and the context of the treaty provision at
issue.194 While TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 play a role, for most of the
concrete ACTA obligations with concise treaty language, the
ordinary meaning of the terms in their context will be the starting
point and primary elements for interpretation.195 Still, there are other
provisions not discussed here which contain open and ambiguous
treaty terms such as “legitimate trade” and “proportionality.”196 The
interpretation of those provisions, like “exceptional circumstances,”
191. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12,
Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
192. See Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, Policy Space for Domestic Public
Interest Measures Under TRIPS (South Centre Research Paper No. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=1039%3Apolicy-space-for-domestic-public-interest-measures-undertrips&Itemid=248&lang=en (explaining the integrative approach as it applies to
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration).
193. Nevertheless, the exceptional character of the release option in Article 18
limits its potential role in the context of transiting generics. Traders and recipients
of generics would depend on the willingness of customs and courts to rely on this
exception. Contracting parties might also take different positions here so that,
again, security and predictability in international trade with generics suffers. In
sum, even if this exception is applied in the context of transiting generics, it is
unlikely to provide a solution that serves as comprehensive safeguard against
seizures such as those by Dutch authorities.
194. See VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31(1); see generally Grosse Ruse - Khan,
supra note 178, at 162-81 (applying VCLT rules of treaty interpretation to TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8)
195. See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/189, reprinted in 1966 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, 220, 221 [hereinafter
Int’l Law Comm’n Rep] (stressing a “textual approach” where the “starting point
of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation
ab initio into the intentions of the parties”).
196. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1), (3).
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will be ripe for guidance from ACTA’s object and purpose, which is
arguably embodied in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.
2. Obligation to Avoid the Creation of Barriers to Legitimate Trade
Since the July 2010 draft, the ACTA text contains a new provision
that may function as an additional safeguard against the use of IP
enforcement procedures as barriers to trade and against abusive
reliance on such procedures.197 In the final December 2010 ACTA
version, the relevant text provides:
ARTICLE 6: GENERAL OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
ENFORCEMENT
1. Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures are available
under its law so as to permit effective action against any act of
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures
shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.198

As indicated above, the new provision is a verbatim copy of
TRIPS Article 41(1).199 The second sentence builds on similar
language in ACTA’s preamble,200 and in Article 13.201 The provision
197. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X, ¶ 1 (General
Obligations with Respect to Enforcement). In the July ACTA text, the whole
provision, which stemmed from a U.S. proposal, is still in brackets. See id. n.8.
The ACTA draft that leaked after the subsequent Washington, D.C. round of
negotiations, however, does not contain any brackets or other indications of dissent
amongst the negotiating parties. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59,
art. 2.X, ¶ 1 (General Obligations with Respect to Enforcement). While there have
been changes in the other paragraphs of the provision on General Obligations, this
text remained the same in the subsequent October draft. ACTA Draft—Oct. 2,
2010, supra note 60, art. 2.X, ¶ 1.
198. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6.
199. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(2).
200. Compare ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. (“Desiring to
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”), with TRIPS Agreement pmbl.
(“Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”).
201. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13 (“In providing for
effective border enforcement of intellectual property rights, a Party should do so in
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contains a binding obligation, horizontally applicable to all
enforcement measures under ACTA. It can be particularly relevant
for border measures under ACTA and their potential to mandate
seizures of generic medicines and other goods in transit in light of
the language “shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards
against their abuse.”202 Since this provision contains a binding
prohibition against applying enforcement procedures as to create
barriers to legitimate trade, it is not surprising that India and Brazil
claim that the E.U. transit seizures violate the TRIPS Article 41(1)
version of this provision.203
In order to assess the operation of the new Article 6(1) of ACTA
in relation to the ACTA provisions which may mandate or allow
transit seizures, the decisive question is when the detention and
seizure of goods in transit amounts to “barriers to legitimate trade.”
Such detentions and seizures arguably create barriers to international
trade by temporarily preventing the free movement of goods in
transit via detention in the transit country, and, when goods are
permanently seized and subsequently destroyed, by inhibiting the
free movement of goods from the country of origin towards the
country of destination. Under WTO law, the principle of freedom of
transit stipulates that “[t]here shall be freedom of transit through the
territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for
international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of
other contracting parties.”204 A contextual interpretation of the term
“barriers to legitimate trade” in TRIPS Article 41(1) thus arguably
includes measures that inhibit the international transit of goods as a
central element to global trade. ACTA Article 6(1) is a verbatim
copy of this TRIPS provision and should be interpreted identically
given that all ACTA negotiating parties are WTO members, and that,
presumably, the negotiating parties want to introduce provisions
consistent with WTO law, especially the TRIPS Agreement.205
a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.”); see also
discussion supra Part III(A)(4) (analyzing the elements of Article 13).
202. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(1). But see id. art. 13
(providing that ACTA parties “should,” rather than “shall,” enforce border
measures in a manner that “avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate trade”).
203. See supra Part II.
204. GATT art. 5(2).
205. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 1 (emphasizing that
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Whereas detentions and seizures of goods in transit are creating
barriers to international trade, difficulties arise especially in relation
to the interpretation of the term “legitimate trade.” For example, how
does one determine the legitimacy of the trade inhibited or prevented
by the operation of IP enforcement procedures—in this case border
measures against goods in transit? In order to address this question it
is useful to first look at the understanding of the identical term in
TRIPS Article 41(1).
In the WTO/TRIPS context, so far no Panel or Appellate Body
report has addressed the interpretation of the relevant part of TRIPS
Article 41(1).206 However, the term “legitimate” as part of the phrase
“legitimate interests”207 has been interpreted by a WTO Panel. In
Canada-Pharmaceutical Products, a WTO Panel defined
“legitimate” as “a normative claim calling for protection of interests
that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that they are supported by relevant
public policies or other social norms.”208 Determining legitimacy
therefore requires a normative assessment of the relevant action,
conduct, or measure based on justifiable public interests and policies.
Such a normative approach finds support in the literature, which
views TRIPS Article 41(1) as an expression of the need for balancing
the interest of title-holders, alleged infringers, and the public
interest.209
Based on this reasoning, “legitimate trade” under TRIPS Article
41(1) means any trade for which a justifiable public policy or interest
exists or which is supported by other social norms. Thus, trade in
generic drugs is legitimate because of the public policy of promoting
cheaper access to medicines and the interest in promoting public
ACTA respects obligations under existing agreements, “including the TRIPS
Agreement”).
206. See generally WTO Analytical Index: TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm#article4
1 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
207. See TRIPS Agreement art. 30 (“Members may provide limited exceptions
to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”) (emphasis added).
208. Panel Report, Canada Patent Protections of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶
7.69, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Panel Report].
209. See, e.g., ICTSD & UNCTAD, supra note 38, at 581.
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health. In comparison, trade in fake drugs, which contain the wrong
dosage of active ingredients, is not legitimate because no interest is
served in promoting access to ineffective or dangerous drugs. Under
such a normative assessment, the barriers to trade created by seizing
and detaining generic drugs in transit are arguably barriers to
legitimate trade and thus inconsistent with TRIPS Article 41(1).
In addition to the normative approach, legitimacy can also be
understood in a positivist sense to mean anything authorized by
law.210 Under such a legalistic approach, any trade which is in
conformity with the law is legitimate trade. Determining legality is
the obvious problem with this approach, in particular, which body of
law should control.211 For the interpretation of “legitimate” in TRIPS
Article 41(1), WTO law is the primary source of guidance, including
the substantive standards of IP protection in the TRIPS Agreement.
The international obligations in TRIPS, however, would not provide
a sufficient answer since internationally traded goods may be
infringing the TRIPS-mandated IP protection in one WTO Member
country but not in another. Based on the concept of territoriality,
these goods may be non-infringing in the country of origin and
destination, but maybe infringing in the country of transit. It is
precisely this scenario that led to the current dispute over transit
seizures between the European Union, India, and Brazil. The
territorial nature of IP rights (and hence of IP legality) is what makes
such a determination of legitimacy inconclusive and somewhat
meaningless. Since ACTA does not affect the fundamental territorial
nature of IP rights, a positivist understanding of the term legitimacy
in Article 6(1) is equally unavailing.
The above arguments speak for a normative, rather than positivist,
understanding of “legitimate trade” under ACTA Article 6(1). Thus,
210. Canada Panel Report, supra note 208, ¶ 7.68 (noting the ordinary meaning
of the term is “conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle” or
“[n]ormal, regular, conformable to a recognized type”);. see also Panel Report,
United States Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 6.224, WT/DS160/R (June
15, 2000) (recognizing a positivist definition of legitimacy).
211. One option is that international rules, notably international trade and IP
treaty rules, determine legality. Another option is that domestic law determines
legality. The latter approach raises a second question: which domestic law?
Applying the laws of the countries of origin, transit, and destination may produce
variable results. See infra Part III(B)(1) (discussing applicable law in IP border
enforcement cases in light of the principle of territoriality).
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any enforcement procedures that create barriers to trade for which a
justifiable public policy exists or which are supported by other social
norms would be considered as “barriers to legitimate trade.” The
only question remaining is what type of public policy or social norms
are relevant? Although ACTA does not contain a comprehensive set
of normative values which could guide the understanding of
legitimacy, the reference to TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 as discussed
above indicate that, inter alia, public health concerns must be taken
into account in the interpretation of ACTA provisions.212 This finds
further support in the preamble to ACTA, which references “the
principles set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health.”213 This confirms that public health concerns are
relevant social norms in determining the legitimacy of trade under a
normative framework.
A more difficult question is which normative considerations and
public policies are decisive, those of the country of production, the
country of transit, or the country of final destination? Here, the
specific free trade rationale of Article 6(1) comes into play.214 If
safeguarding free trade is indeed the rationale for Article 6(1), then
requiring cumulative normative legitimacy based on the public
interests and social norms in all countries involved is too narrow of
an approach. To explain, there may be instances where trade would
not be considered legitimate simply because one country does not
recognize the normative considerations held by others. This would be
problematic if the non-recognizing country is one which has minimal
212. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(3) (“The objectives
and principles set forth in Part I of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular in Articles
7 and 8 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Agreement.”); see also discussion
supra Part III(C)(1) (arguing that Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement supply
the object and purpose of ACTA by reference).
213. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl. Under the Doha
Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5 (a), the importance of the object and purpose of a
treaty, as embodied in TRIPS Agreement arts. 7-8, is highlighted as a principle of
treaty interpretation which guides the understanding of all TRIPS provisions.
Recognizing this principle in ACTA means that Article 7 and 8 TRIPS—
incorporated into ACTA by reference in Article 2(3)—equally guide the
interpretation of all ACTA provisions. For further details, see discussion supra
Part III(A)(1).
214. This is supported by the preamble to ACTA which also expresses the
intention of the negotiating parties to avoid the creation of trade barriers. ACTA
Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, pmbl.
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territorial link to the goods traded. In light of the international and
cross-border nature of trade, justifiable public interests and social
norms may originate from any country directly affected by the trade
and would certainly include the country of origin and the country of
destination. Whether the public policy concerns of the country of
transit are equally relevant, however, should depend on whether the
traded goods have a substantial connection to the transit country.215
This would mean that seizures of goods in transit amount to the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade whenever the trade in these
goods can be justified primarily by a public policy in the country of
origin or the country of destination.
Such a result, however, must be examined for consistency with the
specific border measure provisions in ACTA. In order to achieve an
overall coherent interpretation, the understanding of different
provisions within the same agreement cannot conflict.216 In other
words, the operation of the prohibition to create barriers to legitimate
trade cannot be understood in a way which prohibits border measures
against goods in transit that ACTA explicitly allows or even
mandates. If ACTA would have included a binding obligation to
introduce border measures against IP infringing goods in transit,
there would be little room left for arguing that national seizures of
allegedly patent infringing generics in transit per se violate the free
trade safeguard in Article 6(1). Since the border measure obligations
in the final December 2010 ACTA text exclude patents; since they
allow but do not mandate enforcement against goods in transit; and
since they further can be limited to certain types of IP infringements
under Article 13 on the scope of border measures (such as trademark
215. Similar to questions of the applicable law in private international law, a
substantial connection test could ask whether, for example, the threat of trade
diversion onto the domestic market or other factors establish a sufficient
connection to the territory of the transit country which justifies the application of
that country’s normative values to affect the determination of “legitimate trade.”
For a similar argument that generics in transit constitute legitimate trade when
there is no threat of diversion onto the domestic market of the transit country, see
also Kumar, supra note 26, at 513.
216. This follows from the principle of good faith in treaty interpretation (as
embodied in the VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31 (1)) which is, inter alia, an
expression of the principle of pacta sunt servanda that in turn embodies the
principle of effectiveness. See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 195, at 221; IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 119-120 (2d ed.
1984).
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counterfeiting and copyright piracy),217 there is more room for
applying Article 6(1). As discussed above, the right to introduce
additional enforcement measures is limited by contravening ACTA
provisions.218 Thus, the prohibition to create barriers to legitimate
trade can still function to limit “ACTA-plus” border measures. Not
even the explicit allowance to extend border measures to goods in
transit is immune from this general obligation in Article 6(1). If an
ACTA party decides to make use of this allowance, it must still
ensure that it is doing so in a way which does not create trade
barriers.219
If this insight is applied to the understanding of “legitimate trade”
advocated here, ACTA Article 6(1) will prohibit seizures of goods in
transit as a barrier to legitimate trade whenever the trade in these
goods can be justified by a public policy in the country of origin or
the country of destination. Since the transit and trade in generic drugs
will almost always be justified by public health concerns in the
country of destination, any ACTA contracting party must ensure that
its system of border measures does not create barriers to such trade.
The best option for doing so is to exclude transit from the scope of
the domestic border IP enforcement system altogether. If, however, a
country chooses to extend border measures to transits, it must
comply with Article 6(1) and ensure that the free transit of generics
is not affected. This can be done by addressing the main threat to
generics in transit, namely by eliminating border measures against
ordinary forms of trademark infringements.220 Other mechanisms
may also be an option—such as the applicable law approach in the
Swiss border measure system, which requires that goods in transit
infringe both Swiss IP law and the law of the country of
destination.221
217. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(4).
218. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 2(1); see also
discussion supra Part III(A)(2).
219. Cf. discussion supra Part III(A)(2).
220. See discussion supra Part III(A)(3).
221. For a general explanation on the Swiss approach to border enforcement, see
Ab 1. Juli 2008 in der Schweiz mit neuer rechtlicher Grundlage gegan Fälschung
und Piraterie, STAATSSEKRETARIAT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT SECO (July 1, 2008),
https://www.ige.ch/index.php?eID=tx_cabaghtml2pdf&URL=/juristische-infos/
rechtsgebiete/faelschung-und-piraterie/rechtslage-ab-1-juli2008.html%3Fpdf%3D1&page_uid=362.
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An alternative to border measures against goods in transit is
enforcement in the country of destination. The December 2010
ACTA text is devoid of this alternative, though earlier ACTA drafts
contained a provision to this effect.222 While alternative enforcement
in the country of destination would seem to address the problem of
seizures in the transit country, the operation of such a provision
would have a rather limited effect because it would apply only in
cases where exports or transits are destined to another ACTA
party.223 Further, it remains doubtful that any provision similar to the
proposed Article 2.X offers enforcement in the country of destination
as a reliable alternative. Instead, the proposal seemed to refer only to
situations where an ACTA party requests such information in a
specific instance of transit or export.224 It therefore does not allow
generally excluding right holder applications or ex officio measures a
priori for cases of exportation and transit. Nevertheless, the general
idea of enforcement in the country of final destination as an
alternative to border measures against goods in transit may be
another option to pursue further.225 It certainly would not have

222. One draft stated:
[As an alternative to procedures in Article 2.6.1 and 2.7.1 relating to export or intransit shipments, each Party shall provide that where shipments are exported from that
Party, or shipments are in-transit through that Party, it shall cooperate to provide all
available information to the destination Party, upon request of the destination Party, to
enable effective enforcement against shipments of infringing goods.]

ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 57, art. 2.X (preceding art. 2.9). In the
subsequent July and August ACTA drafts, the provision appeared in slightly
modified forms and was supported only by Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.
See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 2.X (preceding art. 2.9); ACTA
Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 2.X (preceding article 2.9).
223. Given that in most seizure cases the transiting generics were destined for
developing countries, which are not currently negotiating parties of ACTA and are
unlikely to accede to ACTA in the foreseeable future, enforcement in these
destination countries would not be an option under the draft Article 2.X.
224. Alternatively, the proposed Article 2.X may be understood that in cases of
exports and transits, countries are allowed to waive obligations under Articles 2.6.1
and 2.7.1 (now Article 16) if they “provide all available information to the
destination Party, upon request of the destination Party, to enable effective
enforcement against shipments of infringing goods.” But such a reading hinges on
a wide interpretation of “as an alternative to procedures in Articles 2.6.1 and
2.7.1.” Id.
225. For this to be a viable alternative to border measures for goods in transit,
options for communication and cooperation between the relevant authorities in
transit and destination country must be improved, especially in relation to goods
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equivalent potential to create barriers to legitimate trade.
In sum, ACTA Article 6(1) prohibits ACTA parties from applying
their border measures in a way that creates barriers to the trade in
generics. Especially when these countries go beyond ACTA to
extend border measures to goods in transit, they are under an
international obligation to ensure that their domestic border
enforcement systems allow the free transit of generics. In addition,
other ACTA provisions, such as those on civil enforcement regarding
injunctive relief and damages, must be implemented in a way that
does not affect legitimate trade in generics.226 Article 6(1) therefore
functions as a horizontal safeguard against trade barriers and IP
enforcement abuse.

IV. ACTA VERSUS PUBLIC HEALTH AND FREE
TRADE SAFEGUARDS UNDER TRIPS
In a joint statement shortly before the first public release of the
ACTA draft in April 2010, the negotiating parties declared: “ACTA
will not interfere with a signatory’s ability to respect its citizens’
fundamental rights and liberties, and will be consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement and will respect the Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health.”227 As mentioned above, a subsequent press release
after the Lucerne round of negotiations in July 2010 went further,
asserting that “ACTA will not hinder the cross-border transit of
legitimate generic medicines,” and assuring that “patents will not be
covered in the Section on Border Measures.”228
This analysis, however, calls into question the consistency of
certain ACTA provisions with the TRIPS Agreement. As Part III
demonstrates, the most recent ACTA text still allows seizures of

which the transit country considers as being IP infringing on their face.
226. In this manner, ACTA Article 6(1) can also be applied to address concerns
over the impact other IP enforcement obligations, such as those concerning
injunctions, may have on the transit of generic medicines. For an overview of other
concerns related to ACTA, see Concerns raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council,
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/
intellectual_property/info.service/2010/ipr.info.101102.htm.
227. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Joint Statement on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) (Apr. 16, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/10/437.
228. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 63.
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generics in transit based on alleged patent or trademark
infringements in the transit country. And in some instances, the
ACTA rules only allow the release of generics after a considerable
period of detention.229 In other cases, ACTA mandates their
destruction.230 While some ACTA provisions, in particular the
general obligation under Article 6(1), can be applied to limit the
negative impact of ACTA rules to transiting generics, no provision
explicitly prohibits transit seizures. Instead, Article 6(1)’s function to
safeguard trade in generics hinges on the correct interpretation of
ambiguous and open treaty terms like “legitimate trade.”231
Part II pointed to several TRIPS provisions that may constrain the
ability of WTO members to extend border measures to allegedly
patent infringing goods in transit. In their consultation requests, India
and Brazil also relied on TRIPS provisions, which they argue are
infringed by the Dutch transit seizures. They are thereby invoking
TRIPS as an agreement that contains a ceiling on the introduction of
additional IP protection measures.232 As a benchmark constraining
additional protection beyond TRIPS under certain conditions, TRIPS
may also affect the ability of WTO Members, under international
law, to negotiate obligations for such additional protection in ACTA
provisions.233 This section looks at the potential for TRIPS to legally
constrain the TRIPS-plus options under ACTA. The section focuses
on certain ACTA provisions that have the potential to conflict with
TRIPS, and on the general international law parameters that may be
invoked to resolve any conflicts between TRIPS and ACTA.

229. The goods suspected of IP infringement will in principle be released only
once a court or other relevant authority has decided on the infringing character of
the goods. See ACTA Draft Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 19.
230. Once goods are found to IP infringing, the principle remedy is the
destruction or disposal outside the channels of commerce. See id. art. 20(1).
231. See discussion supra Part III(C)(2).
232. See India Consultation Request, supra note 2; Brazil Consultation Request,
supra note 16.
233. In a response to Members of the European Parliament demanding a WTO
inquiry into ACTA, the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy noted that while
TRIPS does not preclude its members from introducing additional measures to
protect IP rights, as the negotiating parties to ACTA are doing, such protection
cannot contravene TRIPS provisions. See Letter from Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen.,
World Trade Org., to EU Parliament Members (May 4, 2010), available at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/WTO-Lamy_Answer-to-MEP-letter.pdf.

2011]

ACTA BORDER MEASURES

705

A. THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL BETWEEN TRIPS AND ACTA
The tension, if not direct conflict, between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus
free trade agreements (“FTAs”) as well as ACTA are evident in the
perceptions of WTO Members. For example, the Indian and Chinese
delegates expressed such concerns in the TRIPS Council Meeting on
June 8-9, 2010.234 On the relation between TRIPS and TRIPS-plus
FTAs such as ACTA the Indian delegate stated:
Although TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum levels
agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they
contravene TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified
on the basis of Art 1:1 since the same provision also states that more
extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such protection
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”. In addition to
laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement also provides
‘ceilings’, some of which are mandatory and clearly specified in the
TRIPS Agreement.235

The delegate further emphasized the potential effects of the
additional enforcement obligations in ACTA on the TRIPS
Agreement: “In view of the recent seizures of generic drug
consignments, [ACTA] provisions relating to ‘in-transit’ in all
likelihood would create barriers to access to essential generic
medicines, as well as access to critical climate change
technologies.”236
Similarly, the Chinese delegate stressed that while TRIPS
generally establishes “only minimum standards of IP protection,” it
also constrains the ability of WTO Members to foresee more
extensive protection by requiring, inter alia, that “such protection
shall not contravene the provisions of this agreement.”237 These
views were shared by delegates from Peru, South Africa, Egypt,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and other developing countries.238 At the
subsequent TRIPS Council Meeting, China threatened to pursue
234. ICTSD, Animated TRIPS Council Meeting Tackles Public Health, ACTA,
Biodiversity, 14 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 16, 2010, available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/78201/.
235. TRIPS-plus Enforcement India, supra note 37.
236. Id.
237. TRIPS-plus Enforcement China, supra note 37 (quoting Article 1(1) of
TRIPS).
238. ICTSD, supra note 234.
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dispute settlement in the WTO as a result of “any negative spill-over
effects” from ACTA.239 China argued that ACTA should be
evaluated to determine whether it is consistent and compatible with
the existing WTO legal framework, whether it impinges on the rights
of WTO members, and whether it creates additional obligations for
WTO members.240
Given many countries’ concerns about conflicts between TRIPS
and subsequent TRIPS-plus FTAs, the conflict potential between
TRIPS and ACTA, in relation to border measures against goods in
transit, must be critically assessed. Specifically, a potential conflict
exists between TRIPS provisions that integrate public health
concerns and free trade aspects and ACTA rules allowing seizures of
transiting generics. As discussed in Part II, examples of TRIPS
provisions that such seizures may violate include Articles 41(1) and
52.241 Other norms may also be relevant, especially from the border
measures section which contains binding safeguards for the interests
of traders.242 Any meaningful analysis here depends on the exact
wording of the final ACTA provisions and their application to
transiting generics. While such a scrutiny was premature in relation
to the earlier, still heavily bracketed ACTA drafts, the December
2010 ACTA text contains the outcome of the final round of
negotiations. The following thus offers an overview of ACTA
provisions potentially conflicting with TRIPS, and sets out some
guidelines for understanding the relevant ACTA and TRIPS
provisions in a mutually consistent manner. In order to frame the
discussion on what constitutes a conflict between TRIPS and ACTA,
the subsections briefly survey the instances in which ACTA border
measures extend beyond TRIPS standards.243
239. See China Slams Nearly Completed ACTA, Questions its WTO
Compatibility, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 2, 2010, http://insidetrade.com/
201011022343572/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/china-slams-nearly-completedacta-questions-its-wto-compatibility/menu-id-173.html.
240. Id.
241. Recall that, under TRIPS, additional IP protection may not contravene
TRIPS provisions. See TRIPS Agreement art. 1(1).
242. Id. arts. 53.1, 2; 55; 56, 58(b). For an in-depth analysis of these sections,
see also Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48.
243. ACTA may directly conflict with TRIPS so that compliance with both
agreements is impossible, or ACTA provisions may indirectly undermine the
exercise of a right under TRIPS, such as a TRIPS flexibility. See discussion infra
Part IV(B).
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1. Scope of Border Measures
While TRIPS requires border measures only against the
importation of counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright
goods,244 in principle, future ACTA parties must provide border
enforcement against imports and exports of goods infringing any IP
right covered in TRIPS, with the exception of patent rights.245
The rather ambiguous provision on the scope of border measures
offers ways to limit enforcement to certain IP infringements if done
“in a manner that does not discriminate unjustifiably between
intellectual property rights and that avoids the creation of barriers to
legitimate trade.”246 For example, based on the arguments above, it
can be applied to exclude ordinary trademark infringements from the
scope of border measures.
Further, ACTA requires ex officio actions in relation to imports
and exports,247 whereas TRIPS merely allows ex officio measures if
certain conditions are fulfilled.248 Finally, like TRIPS, ACTA allows
the extension of border measures to goods in transit.249
In sum, the scope of ACTA border measures differs from TRIPS
in that more types of IP infringements and exports must be included.
TRIPS allows the extension of border measures to other IP
infringements and to goods in transit, provided the parties adhere to
the relevant safeguards for traders and good owners.250 In the ACTA
context, where extension of border measures to goods in transit is
also allowed, the crucial question becomes whether these safeguards
are properly integrated into the ACTA framework.

244. See TRIPS Agreement art. 51. These terms are further defined in Article
51, note 14.
245. See discussion supra Part III(A)(1)-(3).
246. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 13.
247. Id. art. 16(1).
248. TRIPS Agreement art. 58.
249. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 16(2).
250. TRIPS Articles 1(1) and 51 allow these forms of TRIPS-plus protection if
the further requirements of the TRIPS border measure section are met (such as
those in Articles 52-55) and in so far as these forms do not contravene TRIPS
provisions. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 1(1), 51; see also Grosse Ruse - Khan &
Jaeger, supra note 48, at 524.
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2. Applicable Law
While TRIPS requires adequate evidence of infringement “under
the laws of the country of importation,”251 ACTA demands such
evidence based on the “laws of the Party providing the
procedures.”252 For imported goods subject to border measures, the
two rules both lead to the law of the importing country being
decisive for showing prima facie infringement.
For transit cases, the assessment of IP infringement must now be
based on the law of the transit country.253 Here, ACTA takes a
different position than TRIPS. Whether this difference actually
amounts to “facial conflict with the WTO TRIPS Agreement,”254
however, depends on the notion of conflict in international law and
possible ways to reconcile the diverging provisions.255
3. Safeguards for Traders and Goods Owners
ACTA creates more opportunities for right holders to provide
securities,256 but unlike TRIPS, it does not mandate the release of
goods upon provision of a security by the “owner, importer, or
consignee.”257 Instead, under ACTA, goods owners, importers, or
other defendants may only provide securities to obtain possession of
the goods “in exceptional circumstances or pursuant to judicial

251. TRIPS Agreement art. 52.
252. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 17(1).
253. This question of applicable law, however, does not prejudice the question
of whether that country’s substantive IP law actually considers transit of the goods
as an act of infringement. See id. art. 3(2); see also discussion supra Part III(B).
254. Sean Flynn, Amend ACTA: Defining Terms by Country of Importation, AM.
U. WASH. C.. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/amend-acta-defining-terms-bycountry-of-importation.
255. See discussion infra Part IV(B).
256. In addition to the options provided in TRIPS, see TRIPS Agreement art.
53(1), ACTA contains an additional option which allows rights holders to provide
the security “in the form of a bond conditioned to hold the defendant harmless
from any loss or damage resulting from any suspension of the release of, or
detention of, the goods in the event the competent authorities determine that the
goods are not infringing.” See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18.
257. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 53(2), 55 (providing for the release of goods
after ten days of detention upon “the posting of a security in an amount sufficient
to protect the right holder for any infringement”).
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order.”258
Further, while TRIPS has an indemnification provision to protect
importers and owners of goods in the event of wrongful detention of
goods,259 ACTA has no equivalent provision, other than the general
obligation to provide fair and equitable procedures and to provide
“appropriate” protection for “the rights of all participants subject to
procedures.”260
Third, TRIPS contains mandatory limits on the duration of the
initial detention of goods suspected of infringement.261 Although
ACTA does not contain an equivalent rule, the general obligation to
protect the rights of all participants to the procedures in an
appropriate manner may have the same effect.262
Finally, ACTA grants rights to obtain information to right holders
which go beyond those in TRIPS.263 These rights however are subject
to a general privacy safeguard.264
4. Implementing the Article 31(f) TRIPS Waiver
It has been argued that an effective implementation of the TRIPS
“paragraph six mechanism”265 could also be at risk whenever
258. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18.
259. See TRIPS Agreement art. 56.
260. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(2). As an extended
version of TRIPS Article 41(2), ACTA Article 6(2) arguably covers the specific
rights of traders foreseen under TRIPS Article 56, even though ACTA does not
explicitly mention indemnification.
261. See TRIPS Agreement art. 55 (providing that proceedings must be initiated,
or the goods released, within ten days with a possible extension of another ten days
“in appropriate cases”).
262. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(2).
263. Compare id. art. 22, with TRIPS Agreement art. 57.
264. Article 22 begins with the chapeau clause—“[w]ithout prejudice to a
Party’s laws pertaining to the privacy or confidentiality of information”—
indicating that such laws may override the specific duties to provide authorities
with powers to disclose information. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60,
art. 22.
265. For similar allegations in the European Union Transit case, see WTO
General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 ( Sept. 2, 2003) and TRIPS
Amendment, supra note 35. The “paragraph six mechanism,” so termed due to its
original mandate in the Doha Declaration, see Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶
6, which this General Council decision implements, allows exports of medicines
produced under a compulsory license into countries with insufficient
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medication produced under a compulsory license for export to a
country with insufficient manufacturing capacity transits through
ports of ACTA parties.266 Also, in this scenario the ACTA provisions
relevant for border measures against generics in transit offer no
explicit safeguard against seizures solely based on transit
jurisdiction: depending on the scope of IP infringements covered by
domestic border measures of future ACTA parties, any medication
that is patent or trademark protected in domestic law could be subject
to seizure and destruction.267
However, by seizing drugs produced under the paragraph six
mechanism, the future ACTA parties would directly contradict the
efforts undertaken by the WTO and its members to promote access to
medicines in these cases. On one hand, seizures of goods in transit
may inhibit the supply of drugs under the paragraph six mechanism
to countries with no sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacities. On the other hand, ACTA’s general obligation not to
create barriers to legitimate trade may constitute a safeguard which
ensures the free transit of medicines produced under the paragraph
six mechanism.268
5. A General Shift in the IP Enforcement System?
Apart from these specific differences between ACTA and TRIPS
border measure standards, some are concerned about the general
tendency of ACTA to enlarge remedies for right holders, without
retaining the necessary checks and balances to secure the rights of
manufacturing capacities.
266. See Intervention by India, supra note 10; Statement of Brazil, supra note
10; India Consultation Request, supra note 2. Under Parliament & Council
Regulation 816/2006, art. 13(1), 2006 O.J. (L 157) 1, 6 (EC) the E.U.’s
implementation legislation regarding the “paragraph six mechanism,” the
importation, re-exportation, or transit of drugs produced under a compulsory
license, granted pursuant to the paragraph six mechanism, is generally prohibited
and custom authorities must detain these drugs in accordance with Article 14 of the
Regulation 816/2006. Drugs re-exported or in transit to an importing country that
lacks manufacturing capacity are exempted from this prohibition, and the
importing country is thus eligible to receive drugs produced under a compulsory
license abroad in accordance with the paragraph six mechanism. Id. art. 13(2). It is
nevertheless unclear whether this exemption would cover potential seizures based
on the BMR instead of Article 13(1).
267. Cf. Abbott, supra note 15.
268. For details, see discussion supra Part III(C)(2).
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defendants. The concerns raised by India in the October 2010 TRIPS
Council meeting offer a good summary of the potential conflict
between ACTA and TRIPS in this regard:
The draft ACTA limits the protection otherwise available to accused
infringers under the TRIPS Agreement by potentially lowering knowledge
thresholds, limiting due process requirements (e.g., requirements to act
within particular time frames), limiting evidentiary requirements, and by
not specifying the type of authority empowered to make critical decisions.
This shift to summary administrative action may curtail the rights of
accused infringers to defend patent infringement claims, ordinary
trademark and copyright infringement claims. This represents a
substantial transformation from the original concept of enforcement under
the TRIPS Agreement.269

This article cannot offer a comprehensive analysis of whether all
enforcement provisions in ACTA contain appropriate checks and
balances to secure the rights of the defendant. It is worth mentioning,
however, that ACTA contains a general rule providing that “each
Party shall take into account the need for proportionality between the
seriousness of the infringement, the interests of third parties, and the
applicable measures, remedies and penalties.”270 Therefore, ACTA
basically adopts TRIPS’s proportionality rule regarding the final fate
of IP-infringing goods, but here as a general obligation for all
enforcement procedures.271 This in itself is certainly a positive
development. As a general principle, the effective functioning of
ACTA’s proportionality rule depends on ACTA parties’ willingness
and ability to recognize concrete and specific defenses and other
relevant safeguards for the rights of the defendants, such as those
contained in TRIPS Article 42 on civil enforcement and in Articles
53 through 56 on border measures, which are absent from ACTA.
This discrepancy places a heavy burden on the proportionality rule
and its domestic implementation by ACTA parties. It creates
uncertainty and legal insecurity for those bold enough to implement
these general principles by establishing concrete and specific
defenses tailored to the new and strengthened remedies for right
holders. The ambiguity of the so-called “three-step test,” which
269. Concerns raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council, supra note 226.
270. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 6(3).
271. Compare id., with TRIPS Agreement art. 46.
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limits the ability of WTO members to introduce tailored exceptions
and limitations to most IP rights in TRIPS, serves as a cautionary tale
here.272 While it certainly can be interpreted in a balanced manner,
the three-step test has often served as a pretext for arguing that new
exceptions and limitations in national laws would be inconsistent
with TRIPS.273
Unfortunately, developing countries and small economies are
among those most likely to be threatened with dispute settlement or
even unilateral sanctions if they dare to implement these general
principles in ACTA Article 6. This assumes, of course, that they
have accepted the “irresistible” offer to comply with ACTA as part
of an FTA-deal. The asymmetry between concrete and concise
remedies and general checks and balances is, therefore, a systemic
concern with ACTA. While this concern can be addressed by an
interpretation and implementation of Article 6 that takes seriously
the incorporation of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, this outcome relies on
the ability and willingness of ACTA parties to do so.
6. The Role of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 in Interpreting ACTA
Before moving to the conflict analysis, it is worth reiterating some
general observations on the appropriate interpretation of the
substantive provisions in TRIPS and ACTA. In general, the relevant
TRIPS and ACTA provisions are interpreted in light of their ordinary
meaning, context, and the treaty’s object and purpose.274 As
discussed above, Articles 7 and 8 define the object and purpose of
TRIPS.275 All WTO members, including all ACTA negotiating
parties, have confirmed the importance of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 for

272. See TRIPS Agreement arts. 13, 17, 26(2), 30. In essence, these different
versions of the test require domestic exceptions to IP exclusivity to be (1) limited,
(2) without conflict with the normal exploitation of IP, and (3) without prejudice to
the legitimate interests of the rightholder, taking into account legitimate interests of
third parties.
273. See, e.g., Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation
of the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC.
COM. L. 119, 119 (2010), available at http://www.jipitec.eu/
issues/jipitec-1-2-2010/2621/Declaration-Balanced-Interpretation-Of-The-ThreeStep-Test.pdf.
274. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 31.
275. See discussion supra Part III(C)(1).
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the interpretation of all TRIPS provisions.276 Further, WTO members
specifically affirm that TRIPS “should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.”277
Through treaty interpretation, the public health dimension of the
TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration can therefore exercise
an important influence on the appropriate understanding of open
treaty terms such as “legitimate trade,” “abuse,” or “country of
importation.”278 Further, the object and purpose of TRIPS, as
embodied in Articles 7 and 8, arguably has an impact on the
understanding of the term “contravene” in TRIPS Article 1(2). Thus,
the question of whether additional IP enforcement in ACTA
“contravenes” TRIPS provisions is also guided by the balancing
objectives and public interest principles in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8.279
This may also result in findings of contravention in cases in which
TRIPS-plus measures frustrate other WTO members’ abilities to
promote social welfare, protect public health, and facilitate access to
medicines. As this author has argued elsewhere, there is generally no
room for such findings when additional IP protection or enforcement
curtails an optional flexibility under TRIPS as opposed to a
mandatory rule such as in TRIPS Articles 41(1) or 52.280
To the extent that TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 influence the
understanding of TRIPS, the same can be argued for ACTA since
Article 2(3) incorporates these flexibilities by reference.281 Hence,
276. See Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5(a) (emphasizing as one of the key
flexibilities under TRIPS that “[i]n applying the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read
in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular,
in its objectives and principles”).
277. Id. ¶ 4.
278. On the importance of TRIPS’s object and purpose as compared to the other
main elements of treaty interpretation, see Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 178, at
162.
279. On the meaning of the term “contravene” in light of the debate on conflict
of norms in international law, see Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 38, at 67-70.
280. Id. at 70-73. On the similar issue of the appropriate understanding of the
notion of “conflict” between different norms in international law, see discussion
infra Part IV(B).
281. See discussion infra Part III(C)(2) (discussing how TRIPS Articles 7 and 8
influence ACTA’s interpretation through their incorporation via ACTA Article
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Article 2(3) both reduces the conflict potential by mandating a public
health supportive interpretation of ACTA and increases the
likelihood for coherence between TRIPS and ACTA.

B. COHERENCE, NORM CONFLICT, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Given the potential for norm conflicts between TRIPS and ACTA,
described above, this section examines how these potential conflicts
would be resolved under the rules and principles of public
international law.282
1. The Principle of Harmonious Interpretation and Systemic
Integration
Resolution of norm conflicts in international law is foremost
achieved by the principle of harmonious interpretation and systemic
integration, which operates as a presumption against conflict.283 As
embodied in VCLT Articles 31 through 33, a harmonious treaty
interpretation is not possible when the ordinary meaning and context
of the two relevant terms, understood in light of the object and
purpose of the treaties, do not permit a mutually consistent
understanding.284
The fact that TRIPS and ACTA essentially share the same object
and purpose, as embodied in TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, makes a
harmonious interpretation much easier. Several, if not most, of the
differences mentioned above lend themselves to an integrative
approach. For example, with regard to the ACTA options for
defendants to post a bond or other security as a means to obtain the
release of seized goods,285 public health considerations may
2(3) and ACTA’s recognition of the principles embodied in the Doha Declaration).
282. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO:
How Far Can We Go? 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535, 535-78 (2001). See generally Rep.
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC
Conclusions] (outlining techniques of interpretation and rules of conflict resolution
in international law).
283. ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶¶ 4, 17-19. See generally McLachlan,
supra note 190, at 309-19 (proposing an interpretive process to account for
systemic integration as embodied in VCLT Article 31(3)(c)).
284. VCLT, supra note 189, arts. 31-33.
285. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 18.
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constitute an “exceptional circumstance” given ACTA’s object and
purpose, in which case the provision is consistent with the mandatory
cases for such securities covered in TRIPS Article 53(2).286
In the same vein, the general obligation in ACTA Article 6(2) to
protect the rights of all participants in enforcement procedures can be
understood to include the more specific obligation under TRIPS
Article 56 to foresee right holder liability for any injury caused to
defendants through the wrongful detention of goods. ACTA Article
6(2) can equally facilitate a harmonious interpretation that includes
the maximum period of initial detention set forth under TRIPS
Article 55.
Finally, the proportionality rule in ACTA Article 6(3) arguably
applies in all those cases in which ACTA lacks a specific defense or
safeguard for the defendant, but where one is present in TRIPS.287
While this certainly does not remove the asymmetry in ACTA
between concrete and concise remedies on the one hand and mere
general checks and balances on the other, such asymmetry is to some
extent mitigated by the relationship between ACTA and TRIPS.
Thus, the absence of comprehensive and specific checks and
balances in ACTA does not amount to a conflict of norms with
TRIPS in light of the principles of integration and harmonious
interpretation.
2. Defining Norm Conflicts
Resolving norm conflicts also involves defining what constitutes a
true “conflict” of norms.288 In the strictest sense, a conflict exists
only where there is a direct incompatibility such that complying with
one rule necessitates the violation of another.289 The WTO Appellate
Body seems to follow this view.290 Still, this is not the only
286. On the interpretation of this and other ambiguous terms in ACTA in light
of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, see discussion supra Part III(C)(1).
287. On the role of the general proportionality rule, see discussion supra Part
IV(A)(5).
288. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
289. See id. at 167 (discussing the “technical approach” to conflict in
international law).
290. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Guatemala Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998)
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perspective on norm conflict: a broader view finds conflicts when a
treaty obligation limits or prevents the exercise of a right provided by
another treaty.291
In the TRIPS context, if this broader definition of conflict prevails,
a TRIPS-plus rule in ACTA may be in conflict with an optional
TRIPS provision as soon as it limits the ability of a WTO member to
exercise a right or flexibility provided by TRIPS. Whenever such a
conflict then is decided in favor of the TRIPS provision, this
approach could be argued as making TRIPS flexibilities inviolable
and untouchable. Some support for such a position comes from the
Doha Declaration in which WTO members “reaffirm the right of
WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility” for the purpose of public
health protection.292
On the other hand, such a far reaching effect may appear to
contradict the overall notion of optional flexibilities in TRIPS. Since
WTO members implement optional flexibilities through domestic
law, if a WTO member thus decides to waive its right to use a certain
flexibility allowed under TRIPS, this is equally a way of exercising
its right and part of the flexibility TRIPS provides. Thus, applying a
wide notion of norm conflict so as to prevent a WTO member from
making such a decision could be viewed as turning an optional rule
into a mandatory one.
However, one must bear in mind that a broad understanding of
what constitutes a norm conflict in international law does not predetermine the answer to the question which of the conflicting norms
prevails. This is a separate analysis governed by the applicable
conflict resolution tools in either of the conflicting bodies of norms
or in general international law.293 Hence, adopting a wide
understanding of norm conflict does not imply TRIPS flexibilities
prevailing over TRIPS-plus provisions in subsequent international IP
treaties such as ACTA. It merely widens the scope of conflict
(defining conflict as “a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to
the violation of the other provision”).
291. See Pauwelyn, supra note 282, at 551. For an overview on various different
approaches to conflicts or inconsistencies, see ILC Conclusions, supra note 282;
PAUWELYN, supra note 288, at 167-174.
292. Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 4.
293. See discussion infra Part IV(B)(3).
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resolution analysis to include the relationship between optional rights
under TRIPS and subsequent curtailments of these rights in TRIPSplus rules.
In the context of the ACTA-TRIPS relationship, some of the
arguments above speak in favor of adopting a narrow definition of
norm conflict, which means that a conflict only exists when
compliance with one rule necessitates the violation of another rule.294
This approach also aligns with the understanding of the term
“contravene” in TRIPS Article 1(1).295 However, the resolution of
norm conflicts becomes more limited and technical under this
approach. The narrow definition of conflict would not eradicate the
conflict potential between TRIPS and ACTA, as long as it is based
on the operation of mandatory TRIPS limits to additional IP
protection and a corresponding obligation for such an additional
protection in ACTA. For example, if the final ACTA text would
have mandated the seizure of generics in transit, as discussed above,
TRIPS obligations would be violated by complying with such an
ACTA obligation.296 But a narrow definition excludes an important
part of potential conflicts, namely the relation between TRIPS
flexibilities and subsequent TRIPS-plus rules, from its scope. A
wider understanding of norm conflict avoids that and appears more
apt to address the need for policy coherence between TRIPS and
ACTA.297 In the end, the main argument in favor of a wider
understanding is that it does not conflate conflict definition and
conflict resolution. As a conflict resolution tool, Article 1(1) TRIPS
and its notion of “contravening” also have no bearing on what should
constitute a norm conflict between TRIPS and ACTA. Instead, it is
only relevant in the resolution of conflicts discussed below.
Among the ACTA–TRIPS differences discussed in Part IV(A)
above, those pertaining to the scope of border measures under ACTA
fall inside the wide definition of conflict. In particular the mandatory
extension of the types of IP infringements to be covered by border
294. On the operation of the specific ACTA conflict clause, see discussion supra
Part IV(B)(2).
295. See discussion supra Part II(B).
296. See discussion supra Part III(A)(2).
297. Such coherence is increasingly claimed between the ability to exercise
TRIPS flexibilities and TRIPS-plus IP provisions in FTAs. See TRIPS-plus
Enforcement China, supra note 37; TRIPS-plus Enforcement India, supra note 37.
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measures under ACTA curtails the flexibilities TRIPS foresees in
this regard.298 Another norm conflict may exist if one finds that
ACTA does not adhere to the relevant safeguards for traders and
goods owners in TRIPS. As explained above, however, the specific
safeguards contained in TRIPS Articles 53-56 can be encompassed
by the general checks and balances rules in ACTA Article 6.299 Here,
a harmonious interpretation mitigates any potential conflict.
This also applies to the safeguard against IP enforcement
functioning as a barrier to legitimate trade under TRIPS Article
41(1). Given that ACTA contains a verbatim copy of this rule in its
Article 6(1), any implementation of ACTA that creates barriers to
legitimate trade equally conflicts with ACTA Article 6(1).300 ACTA
and TRIPS therefore both prohibit the application of border IP
enforcement in a way that inhibits international trade and especially
the free transit of generic medicines. This result also speaks against
findings of norm conflict in the implementation of the “paragraph six
mechanism” on the exportation of medicines to countries with
insufficient manufacturing capacities. Implementing ACTA in a way
that inhibits the trade and transfer of medicines produced under this
mechanism would already amount to a violation of Article 6(1).
However, a norm conflict—even in its narrow meaning—may
exist in relation to the different applicable law rules. While TRIPS
Article 52 requires adequate evidence of infringement “under the
laws of the country of importation,” ACTA Article 17(1) demands
such evidence based on the “laws of the Party providing the
procedures.” Does adherence with one rule hence lead to
inconsistency with the other? For allegedly infringing imported
goods, the applicable law is that of the importing country under both
TRIPS and ACTA. For goods in transit, however, the distinct rules
lead to the law of the importing country under TRIPS, and to the law
of the transit country under ACTA. A broad interpretation of
“country of importation,” under TRIPS Article 52, to include the
transit country may be a way to harmonize the provisions. In
applying the VCLT interpretative rules, however, the object and

298. Cf. discussion supra Part IV(A)(5).
299. See discussion supra Part IV(B)(1).
300. See discussion supra Part III(C)(2).
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purpose of TRIPS work against such broad interpretation.301 Since
the VCLT rules of interpretation delineate the limits of the concept
of harmonious interpretation to prevent norm conflicts, ACTA
Article 17(1) is therefore in conflict with TRIPS Article 52.
3. Conflict Resolution Tools in TRIPS and ACTA
Conflict resolution depends on the applicable conflict resolution
rules, which may derive from either of the two treaties or from
general international law.302 Although TRIPS Article 1(1) does not
directly address the consistency of additional IP protection in
international treaties, but instead refers to additional protection in
domestic law, it should be understood as the relevant TRIPS conflict
norm in relation to additional IP protection in general.303 As
discussed above, Article 1(1) prohibits additional IP protection that
contravenes TRIPS provisions and hence only upholds a binding
TRIPS norm constraining additional IP protection over subsequent
contrary obligations in relations between WTO members.304 From the
WTO/TRIPS perspective, the obligations under TRIPS Article 52
constrain the ability of WTO members to set contravening standards
in ACTA. The flexibilities under TRIPS Article 51 on the other hand
allow extending border measures beyond the minimum scope of
imports of trademark counterfeits and pirated copyright goods.
Doing so constitutes an optional right which a WTO member may
choose to exercise. The ACTA obligations which mandate a wider
scope affect this right, but do not “contravene” TRIPS in the sense of
Article 1(1). As argued above, finding a TRIPS-plus rule to
contravene a TRIPS flexibility in effect turns an optional provision
into a mandatory one.305
The relevant conflict resolution rule in ACTA sets out as a central

301. See Grosse Ruse - Khan & Jaeger, supra note 48, at 534-36; discussion
supra Part II.
302. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 282, at 544-45.
303. Cf. Letter from Pascal Lamy, supra note 233. For a more detailed
discussion, see Henning Grosse Ruse - Khan, The International Law Relation
Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards
Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2011).
304. See discussion supra Part IV(A).
305. See discussion supra Part IV(B)(2). For further details, see also Grosse
Ruse - Khan, supra note 303.
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tenet its intention to respect existing agreements, including TRIPS.306
Thus, ACTA expresses the intention of the negotiating parties not to
derogate from any WTO/TRIPS obligations. The final ACTA text
uses only the term “obligations,” as opposed to the use of “rights and
obligations” in the conflicts clauses of some FTAs. This suggests
that the negotiating parties believe the future ACTA may prevail
over optional TRIPS flexibilities. But as far as TRIPS obligations are
concerned, namely binding limits to additional IP protection, those
would prevail in the event of a conflict in the narrow sense defined
above. Thus, the two conflict norms in TRIPS and ACTA lead to
equivalent and consistent results: TRIPS would prevail over ACTA
only in case of a conflict with a mandatory TRIPS limit on additional
IP protection.
Therefore, in relation to the conflict between TRIPS Article 52
and ACTA Article 17(1), the binding obligation in TRIPS prevails
over ACTA. While ACTA Article 1 mandates this result, Article
16(2) explicitly allows border measures against goods in transit.307
The applicable law rule in ACTA Article 17(1) leads to the
application of the law of the transit country, which conflicts with
TRIPS despite the intention in ACTA Article 1 not to derogate from
TRIPS. The best way to resolve this problem is to redraft ACTA’s
applicable law rule. If this does not happen, the most appropriate
solution is to apply TRIPS Article 52 to cases where the ACTA rule
leads to conflicting results. Thus, if a future ACTA party decides to
extend border measures to goods in transit, their IP-infringing
character must nevertheless be decided on the basis of the law of the
country of importation, understood as the country of final
destination, and not the law of the transit country.
Interestingly, in the July ACTA text, some negotiating parties
proposed a different version of Article 1 which would have ensured
that ACTA would not derogate from existing rights and obligations
that the ACTA parties owe one another under TRIPS—“Nothing in
this Agreement shall derogate from [EU/NZ/Sing: any existing rights
and] any obligation of a Party with respect to another Party under
existing agreements, including [TRIPS].”308 The bracketed addition,
306. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 60, art. 1.
307. Id. art. 16(2).
308. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 58, art. 1.1.
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proposed by the E.U., New Zealand, and Singapore, would have also
ensured that ACTA would not derogate from existing rights the
ACTA parties owe one another under TRIPS. In the subsequent
ACTA draft leaked in August 2010, however, the text referred only
to “obligations.”309 Still, the question arises whether language along
the lines of the July ACTA text might function to safeguard TRIPS
flexibilities insofar as their operation is undermined by ACTA
provisions.
This seems unlikely, however, for many reasons. First, the
negotiating parties may understand “rights and obligations” with
respect to each other as describing a treaty obligation in international
law from a dual perspective where the obligation of one party is the
right of another party. If so, the term would still only apply to
obligations in international law and not as a safeguard for TRIPS
flexibilities as optional treaty rights. Second, even if one assumes
that the bracketed text applies to TRIPS flexibilities, it is limited to
rights that future ACTA parties owe to each other. If these countries
decide to waive rights by not exercising certain TRIPS flexibilities,
then any ACTA provision that undermines the use of such a
flexibility would arguably not derogate from such a right within the
meaning of the July draft of Article 1. Finally, because ACTA
contains specific TRIPS-plus rules, the only interpretation of which
undermines the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities, the operation of
Article 1 cannot lead to a result which renders the specific TRIPSplus provision inutile or ineffective.310 In sum, it remains rather
doubtful that the bracketed addition in the July version of Article 1
would operate to prevent specific TRIPS-plus rules in ACTA from
undermining TRIPS flexibilities. Only where such rules in ACTA are
open-textured or ambiguous in their impact on TRIPS would such a
version of Article 1 safeguard TRIPS flexibilities.311

309. See ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 59, art. 1.1 (“Nothing in this
Agreement shall derogate from any obligation [NZ/US/Kor/J/CH/Mex/Can/Sing:
of a Party with respect to any other Party] under existing agreements, including the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”).
310. As explained in supra note 216, this follows from the application of the
principle of good faith in treaty interpretation as embodied in VCLT, supra note
189, art. 31 (1).
311. This result would however already follow from the principle of harmonious
interpretation as discussed supra Part IV(B)(1).
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4. Conflict Rules in General International Law
General international law conflict norms support the findings of
the previous section. VCLT Article 30 concerns the application of
successive treaties on the same subject matter.312 According to VCLT
Article 30(2), TRIPS should prevail in the event of an
incompatibility, given ACTA’s intent not to derogate expressed in
Article 1.313
In addition, ACTA may also be subject to VCLT Article 41, which
concerns inter-se agreements to modify multilateral treaties between
certain of the parties.314 In relation to the WTO/TRIPS Agreement,
ACTA constitutes an inter-se agreement since it would be concluded
amongst some members of the WTO and modify the TRIPS
enforcement obligations as between themselves, mainly by adopting
stronger standards. This would make ACTA’s applicability in
relation to TRIPS subject to the requirements of VCLT Article 41.
One issue that arises is whether TRIPS Article 1(1) can be viewed as
a “possibility for modification” under VCLT Article 41(1). If so, the
qualification not to contravene TRIPS would be decisive for the
ACTA-TRIPS relationship.
If one does not view TRIPS Article 1(1) as such a clause
conditionally allowing subsequent inter-se treaties, then ACTA is a
valid inter-se modification of TRIPS enforcement standards so long
as the requirements of VCLT Article 41(1)(b) are met.315 The main
issue here would be whether any modification, namely stronger IP
enforcement standards, relates to a TRIPS provision, “derogation
312. On the operation of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention as a conflict norm,
see ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶ 24; Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 303.
313. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 30(2) (“When a treaty specifies that it is subject
to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty,
the provisions of the other treaty prevail” in the event of an incompatibility).
314. Id. art. 41. The conditions set out by Article 41 do not necessarily lead to
the invalidity of the relevant inter-se treaty norm; rather, the consequences depend
on an interpretation of the original treaty. See ILC Conclusions, supra note 282, ¶
29. In relation to the original multilateral treaty, one might generally assume mere
inapplicability, instead of invalidity, of the of the relevant inter-se treaty norm.
315. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(1)(b) (providing that parties to a multilateral
treaty may alter the treaty as to themselves if “the modification in question is not
prohibited by the treaty and (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of
their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; (ii) does not
relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole”).
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from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object
and purpose of the treaty as a whole.”316 Specifically, the question is
whether any ACTA TRIPS-plus standard derogates from a TRIPS
rule in a way that is incompatible with the TRIPS objectives
expressed in Articles 7 and 8.317 ACTA fails to meet the requirements
of VCLT Article 41(1)(b), therefore, only in situations where ACTA
rules cannot be cured of their incompatibility with TRIPS through
the incorporation of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 by reference, mainly
where ACTA uses precise treaty language that is immune to an
interpretation in light of Article 7 and 8.318
Given the very general terms used in the balancing objectives and
public interest principles of TRIPS, this standard seems difficult to
apply. Since the effect of inter-se modifications is generally confined
to the national IP regimes of the modifying parties, the inter-se
derogation from TRIPS flexibilities, as such, cannot be viewed as
incompatible with the “effective execution of the object and purpose
of the treaty as a whole.”319 Instead, the operation of VCLT Article
41 should require an effect on other WTO members and their ability
to implement the TRIPS objectives.320 If a TRIPS-plus inter-se treaty
inhibits the ability of other WTO members to exercise their rights
under TRIPS, i.e., to use the TRIPS flexibilities effectively, then
such a modification also violates VCLT Article 41(1)(b)(ii). That
means, would ACTA mandate the seizures of generics in transit in
any way, the negative impact on other WTO members’ right to rely
on TRIPS flexibilities, such as the Doha “paragraph six mechanism,”
would violate VCLT Article 41(1)(b). However, as argued above, the
prohibition on the creation of trade barriers under ACTA Article 6(1)
should serve as a safeguard against such a negative impact on the
“paragraph six mechanism.”
Finally, ACTA may also pose a problem under VCLT Article
316. On the application of VCLT Article 41 in relation to TRIPS and FTAs in
general, see Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the
WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 WORLD J.
TRADE 571, 571-601 (2009); Grosse Ruse - Khan, supra note 303.
317. On the role of Articles 7 and 8 as the object and purpose of TRIPS, see
Doha Declaration, supra note 43, ¶ 5.
318. On the operation and limits of TRIPS Articles 7 and 8 as ACTA treaty
objectives, see discussion supra Part III(C)(1).
319. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(1)(b)(ii).
320. This is also consistent with VCLT Article 41(1)(b)(i). See supra note 315.
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41(2).321 Unless the ACTA negotiating parties have discharged their
notification duty in respect of all other WTO members, they are
acting in violation of the VCLT.322 That said, it is doubtful that a
violation of VCLT Article 41(2) will have any practical effect.
In sum, the general international law conflict rules, especially
those contained in VCLT Articles 30 and 41, support the results
found under the specific conflict clauses in TRIPS Article 1(1) and
ACTA Article 1. To the extent that TRIPS contains a binding limit
on additional IP protection and enforcement, it will prevail over
ACTA. On the other hand, optional TRIPS flexibilities are unlikely
to prevail over TRIPS-plus obligations under ACTA, unless ACTA
violates requirements established in VLCT Article 41(1)(b) by
affecting the rights of other WTO members to exercise these
flexibilities.323

CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed the ACTA provisions on border
measures against the backdrop of Dutch seizures of generics in
transit, and the resulting initiation of dispute settlement proceedings
by India and Brazil against both the E.U. and the Netherlands.
According to both India and Brazil, the E.U. and Dutch measures are
inconsistent with TRIPS Articles 1(1) and 41 and other TRIPS norms
from the section on border measures (Articles 51-60). These alleged
infringements do not result from a failure to meet the TRIPS
minimum standards of IP protection and enforcement; rather, it is the
TRIPS-plus character of the measures that led to the seizure of
generics in transit. Thus, for the first time in WTO dispute
settlement, TRIPS has been used as a benchmark for constraining
additional IP protection. Given this new perspective on TRIPS, the
321. VCLT, supra note 189, art. 41(2) (requiring the modifying parties to notify
any other parties to the agreement of their intent to modify and the proposed
modification).
322. The WTO notification mechanism with respect to Regional Trade
Agreements under Article XXIV of GATT or Article V of GATS apparently has
not been used by the ACTA negotiating parties. See Regional Trade Agreements
Information System, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Public Maintain
RTAHome.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
323. Note that this would also violate the general principle that “[a] treaty does
not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.” VLCT,
supra note 189, art. 34.
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TRIPS-plus elements contained in ACTA, which relate to IP
enforcement at the border, warrant close scrutiny.
While the final ACTA text does not mandate the extension of
border measures against goods in transit, it certainly allows the
detention of goods suspected of infringing trademarks and patents in
the transit country. This can easily lead to the seizure of transiting
generics, similar to the Dutch seizures previously mentioned. ACTA
parties have the option to avoid this threat because the enforcement
mechanisms threatening the international trade in generic drugs are
not mandatory. Moreover, future ACTA parties have a general
obligation to prevent IP enforcement procedures from creating
barriers to legitimate trade. As argued above, this obligation acts to
prohibit future ACTA parties from implementing ACTA in a way
that inhibits the international trade and transit in generic medicines.
This understanding of ACTA’s safeguards against trade barriers
finds support in its incorporation of TRIPS Article 7 and 8, which
play a strong interpretative role in the understanding of ACTA
norms.
Although ACTA contains a general obligation to protect the rights
of defendants and third parties, ACTA provides comprehensive and
concise provisions on remedies that asymmetrically protect rights
holders. This imbalance raises systemic concerns because it places
the burden of a proportional, fair, and equitable enforcement system
primarily on ACTA parties. Therefore, future ACTA parties must
take these general obligations seriously and draft concrete defenses
and other safeguards for all those affected by the new extended
remedies. It remains to be seen whether the uncertainty inherent in
the general obligations will prevent developing countries, in
particular, from doing so.
In acknowledging that TRIPS contains both minimum and
maximum standards for IP protection and enforcement, it follows
that TRIPS can constrain the ability of WTO members to enter into
TRIPS-plus agreements like ACTA. In the case of ACTA, however,
most TRIPS-plus border measure obligations do not amount to
contravention of TRIPS provisions. First, ACTA’s general
obligations can be interpreted harmoniously with the specific
safeguards for free trade in TRIPS Article 53 through 56. Second, a
contravention of TRIPS provisions does not exist when merely
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optional TRIPS flexibilities are undermined by more stringent IP
enforcement under ACTA. The TRIPS and ACTA rules on the
applicable law for judging the IP infringing character of goods in
transit are the only provisions truly in contravention. Here, conflict
resolution provisions in ACTA, TRIPS, and general international law
operate to prioritize the application of TRIPS Article 52 over ACTA
Article 17(1) to the extent of conflict. This example highlights the
need to redraft certain of ACTA’s provisions to create consistency
with the TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, if ACTA’s negotiating parties were to truly take seriously
their pledge for TRIPS consistency, they should also have strived for
policy coherence. Rather than including a few general checks and
balances for the defendant, the negotiating parties should have
crafted specific safeguards for all interested parties affected by the
ACTA enforcement rules in order to counterbalance the
comprehensive new remedies created for rights holders. It is this
asymmetry that creates the gravest systemic concerns with ACTA.

